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 Each day, the citizens of the United States of America are likely to be 
reminded of their nation in any number of subtle ways.  What are the effects of this 
reminding?  In the present work, sixteen experiments are reported in which there is 
converging evidence that a subtle reminder of America leads to bias against outgroups 
despite that Americans, in general, and in the present study, appear to associate 
America with egalitarianism.  Evidence for bias was found on both implicit and 
explicit attitudes measures, and was directed toward the outgroup at both the group 
and individual level.  Moreover, the consequences of these attitudes included feelings 
of psychological distance from the outgroup, reduced support for an African-American 
political candidate, and poorer ratings for an African-American job candidate.  The 
potential mechanisms for both explicit and implicit effects of a reminder of America 
are discussed. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Just as citizens shape a nation, the national ethos, traditions, values, and history 
associated with a nation influence its citizens.  The impact of a nation’s values, ideals, 
and traditions on individuals has been empirically documented only sparingly (for 
exceptions, see Bannister & Saunders, 1978; Hong, Benet-Martinez, Chiu, & Morris, 
2003).  Anecdotally, however, it is not difficult to think of examples in which national 
values and ideals influence attitudes and behavior.  A politician might cite his belief in 
the national ethos as the impetus for service to the government; a soldier’s decision to 
fight, and even die, for her country, is likely to be rooted in her understanding of, and 
support for, national values; and lawyers practice everyday to protect these same 
ideals.  Indeed, individuals know the traditions, values, ideals, and history of their 
nation, and this information undoubtedly affects them.  As noted, the nature of that 
influence has not been widely studied, but drawing from relevant social cognitive 
research, it is contended here that it depends on at least two factors.  First, the nature 
of the influence will depend on what available associations people have with their 
nation that are relevant for a particular domain, which could include information about 
the types of characterizations and practices they associate with their nation (e.g., 
Bargh, 1997; Wilson, 2002).  Second, the influence of a nation on its citizens might 
depend on whether one is consciously, deliberately thinking about their nation, or 
alternatively, subtly reminded of their nation, perhaps without even being aware of the 
reminding (e.g., Bargh, 1997; Wilson, 2002).  In the following, these factors are 
considered in the context of intergroup relations. 
Intergroup relations is a domain for which citizens of many nations seem to 
have relevant, ready associations with their nation.  The United States of America is 
no exception to this rule.  The nation is commonly referred to as a melting pot, though 
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historians, psychologists, and sociologists have contended that rather than a melting 
pot, America idealistically represents something better described as a salad bowl:  a 
place where multiple, distinct groups harmoniously coexist, variously referred to as 
cultural pluralism and multiculturalism (e.g., Milton, 1964; Glazer, 1970; Adams & 
Adams, 2001).  In many ways, America has lived up to these characterizations, with 
the wide array of races, ethnicities, and religions, coexisting within its borders.  There 
are over 300 languages spoken in the U.S., it is one of the most racially and ethnically 
heterogeneous nations, and its religious diversity distinguishes it from the world 
(United States Census 2000; Jones, Doty, Grammich, Horsch, Houseal, Lynn, 
Marcum, Sanchagrin, & Taylor, 2002).  But, America stands for something more than 
basic multiplicity.  As noted by many scholars, America is now, and has always been, 
associated with equitable, and equal, treatment of its people.  In fact, the centrality of 
egalitarianism to America has been clear since its inception—it is prominent among 
the values highlighted and celebrated in many of the founding documents (Lipset, 
1996; McCloskey & Zaller, 1984; Myrdal, 1944; Sears, Henry, & Kosterman, 2000).  
Both the United States Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights, for 
example, make direct reference to the equality of American people, and their freedom 
to choose their lifestyles without persecution.  More to the point, Americans recognize 
and support the importance of egalitarianism to both America and their everyday lives.  
For example, Americans cite equal access to opportunities and treating all people 
equally as quintessential to being American, and endorse diversity in their personal 
lives (Cullen, 2004; Devos & Banaji, 2005; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997).   
It may be unsurprising then, that there is evidence that reminding Americans of 
their nation can lead them to act in a more egalitarian way.  Research in cognitive and 
social psychology has demonstrated that the cognitive activation of a concept in 
memory can influence individuals’ momentary beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors.  
  3 
Current models of memory posit that when a concept, or rather its cognitive 
representation, is activated through some form of priming, information that is 
associated with that concept will also become activated (Devine, 1989, Macrae, 
Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995; Bargh, 1997; Bargh, 2007).  Some or all activated 
information, in turn, shapes subsequent attention, beliefs, and attitudes, and effects 
behavior.  Conceivably, given America’s founding principles, egalitarianism is one 
type of information that is likely to become activated when the concept, America, is 
activated.  And indeed, there is evidence both that egalitarianism is activated when the 
concept of America is made accessible, and that its activation influences individuals in 
predictable ways.  As mentioned earlier, for example, asking people explicitly about 
their American-related attitudes results in strong self-reported support for 
egalitarianism (Devos & Banaji, 2005).  Likewise, Butz, Plant, and Doerr (2007) 
found that considering intergroup attitudes while in front of a large American flag, 
versus in the absence of the American flag, led to less hostile attitudes toward a non-
White ethnic group.  
Despite a strongly endorsed commitment to egalitarianism, however, America 
possesses a sordid history of intergroup conflict among various racial, ethnic, and 
religious groups.  Several well-known supporters of abolition have made reference to 
this inconsistency, including Martin Luther King, Jr., Abraham Lincoln, Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton, and perhaps most famously, Thomas Day, who in noting that many of 
the signers of the Declaration of Independence owned slaves, wrote, “If there be an 
object truly ridiculous in nature, it is an American patriot, signing resolutions of 
independency with the one hand, and with the other brandishing a whip over his 
affrighted slaves” (Armitage, 2007).  In spite of a philosophical endorsement of 
equality, then, America has often embraced discriminatory social practices.  At one 
time or another, many ethnic and religious groups, such as the Irish, Polish, Italian, 
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Japanese, Catholic, and Jewish have faced bigotry in the United States, usually 
peaking at times of war or mass immigration, and eventually waning (Boyer, Clark, 
Hawley, Kett, & Rieser, 2000; Fetzer, 2000).  More recently, bias against people of 
Arab and Mexican descent has become increasingly aggressive, perhaps similarly 
attributable to current socio-political conditions, such as the Iraq War, and the 
immigration of Mexicans to America during an economic recession.  Arguably, 
however, no other group has been subjected to prejudice for as long, or as extremely, 
as people of African descent.  Since the arrival of Europeans to the land that would 
later become America, people of African descent have faced vile forms of 
discrimination (e.g., Hine, Hine, & Harrold, 2000; Kusmer & Trotter, 2009).  Initially, 
the mistreatment of Africans was only normatively accepted, but within a short time, 
restrictions on the rights of Africans, and even the enslavement of Africans, became a 
part of law (e.g., the Naturalization Act of 1790, the Three-fifths compromise and the 
Jim Crow laws).  The 1860s and 1870s brought the Civil War and the emancipation of 
the slaves, and with these changes, an end to legalized discrimination, largely in 
recognition of the contradiction between discriminatory laws and the documented 
principles upon which the country was founded.  Nevertheless, still today, prejudice 
against many groups, including African-Americans, is pervasive.  Sociological and 
psychological studies on education, access to resources, and intergroup behaviors, 
beliefs and attitudes suggest that bias against Blacks and other non-White groups still 
exists, though expressed in a more covert manner than it once was (Quilian, 2006; 
McConahay, 1986; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 
1995; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). 
Thus, on the one hand, there is evidence that America is associated with 
fairness, and more specifically, the impartial treatment of all its citizens.  On the other 
hand, a history of prejudice, both overt and covert, and both official and informal, also 
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may be closely tied to America.  Given these two types of conflicting information 
potentially associated with America—egalitarianism and discrimination—how might 
reminding Americans of their nation influence them, particularly in regard to their 
attitudes and behaviors toward diverse groups?  Thus far, evidence from the limited 
literature on this topic has suggested that priming America results in egalitarian 
attitudes, however, this work has not examined the effect of priming America in a 
subtler manner (for exceptions, see Hong et al., 2003; Wong & Hong, 2005; Ferguson 
& Hassin, 2007).  Research in social cognition, and specifically work on dual process 
models, suggests that how a given stimulus, in this case, our nation, affects us can 
depend on its level of processing (e.g., Bargh, 2007; Wilson, 2002).  In short, priming 
a particular concept can result in a dissociation, such that one set of effects is observed 
when that concept is subject to nonconscious, shallow, or superficial processing, while 
an entirely different set of effects is observed when it is consciously, deliberately 
considered.   
Given research on dissociations, then, there are two possibilities for how a 
subtle, versus a blatant reminder of America might affect individuals.  One possibility 
is that both subtle and blatant America primes lead to egalitarianism toward diverse 
groups.  Indeed, that an egalitarianism effect is found when one is consciously, 
explicitly processing America, suggests that there is an associative link between 
America and egalitarianism that could produce egalitarianism when shallowly 
processing the stimulus (e.g., Bargh, 2007).  Alternatively, shallow processing could 
lead to distinct effects, perhaps even the opposite of those that have emerged from 
more blatant priming (e.g., Bargh, 2007).   
Work in social cognition has illustrated both that subtle exposure to stimuli can 
have large, sometimes surprising effects on behavior, attitudes, and beliefs, and that 
these effects can differ significantly from those resulting from blatant exposure to the 
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same stimuli (e.g., Bargh, 2007).  In the case of an America prime, that subtle and 
blatant exposure might produce conflicting effects is a viable possibility, particularly 
given the long history of prejudice in America, underlining the potential for an 
associative link between prejudice and America.  Empirically, such a link has not yet 
been demonstrated, however, recent research by Devos and Banaji (2005) is consistent 
with this idea.  In their studies, the researchers found that White and Asian Americans 
associated America with Caucasian more than with other ethnicities, but only when 
this association was measured implicitly.  One potential implication of these findings 
is that the link between America and White is indicative of an implicit evaluative link 
between these two concepts, such that America is associated with positivity toward 
Whites and negativity toward non-White groups—that is, essentially, a link between 
America and prejudice.  If this is true, then a subtle reminder of America could lead to 
bias toward non-White groups, despite that an explicit reminder seems to lead to 
egalitarianism (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2005).  This prediction is examined in further 
detail in the next sections.  In addition, the potential boundary conditions and 
mechanisms of this predicted effect are discussed. 
Implicit effects of America cues on bias 
 It is predicted that a subtle, implicitly processed, reminder of America will 
lead to bias against non-White groups, and in particular, African-Americans.  Bias and 
prejudice are used interchangeably in this dissertation and refer to negative attitudes 
toward, or evaluations of, groups or individuals (Allport, 1954; Billig, 1976; 
Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004; Banaji, 2001).  A large body of research 
accumulated over the last few decades, suggests that our cognitions, feeling, and 
behaviors can all be triggered by stimuli in our environment.  The effects of stimuli 
presented in this manner can occur without our conscious attention, awareness, 
control, or effort—that is, they can occur automatically (e.g., Bargh, 2007; Tversky & 
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Kahneman, 1983; Sloman, 1996; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006).  The descriptive terms for this type of automatic processing of stimuli depend 
upon the theory, but include the following: implicit, nonconscious, and shallow (e.g., 
Bargh, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).  In an experimental context, 
conditions are often introduced that are meant to mimic this subtle environmental 
triggering.  For example, a stimulus could be presented parafoveally, in a subtle or 
ostensibly unrelated manner, or even below the conscious threshold of visual or 
auditory perception.  While these experimental methods may seem contrived, consider 
for a moment how one encounters most of the world.  Of the many stimuli to which 
one is exposed each day, how many are thoroughly, consciously processed?  It is 
likely that few make it to conscious attention, and even less get deliberately processed.  
A reminder of America is likely to be encountered in a similar manner:  passing an 
American flag, attaching a stamp with an American emblem to an envelope, or even 
hearing the national anthem as one impatiently, distractedly waits for a sporting event 
to begin on television.    
A number of dual process models have made distinctions between implicit 
processing and conscious, or explicit, processing.  The precise details of what 
distinguishes implicit from explicit processing varies to some extent by theory, 
however, there are some distinctions that exist across most models.  For one, most 
models describe some difference in the speed and depth of processing, with implicit 
processing being quicker and more shallow that explicit processing (e.g., Bargh 2007; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Sloman, 1996; Chaiken & Trope, 1999).  Second, for a 
process of a stimulus or the effects of a stimulus to be considered implicit, these 
models contend that the processing must occur without attention, awareness, control, 
or effort (e.g., Bargh 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Sloman, 1996; Chaiken & 
Trope, 1999).  Recent models of dual cognitive processes have suggested that implicit 
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and explicit (or controlled) processes are not mutually exclusive, but rather that both 
processes occur simultaneously (e.g., Sun, 2002; Payne 2001; Payne, Burkley, & 
Stokes, 2008; Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby, 2002).  Thus, differences in outcomes are 
due to the degree of relative influence of one versus the other type of processing, 
which is calculated using process dissociation analyses.  These models, though 
positing more dynamic processing, still largely preserve the distinctions outlined 
earlier—that is, relatively more implicit versus controlled processing tends to take on 
the characteristics of implicit processing described earlier, and relatively more 
controlled versus implicit processing takes on the characteristics of explicit 
processing.  The distinctions between implicit and explicit processing will be further 
considered in the Mechanisms section, however, for the remainder of this section, the 
discussion will focus exclusively on implicit processing, and in particular, why 
implicitly priming America might lead to bias toward outgroups.  It is suggested here 
that context-dependent activation could underlie such an effect, to which this 
discussion turns next. 
Context-dependent activation, also termed pattern activation, is a phenomenon 
that arises from the fact that representations of concepts are flexible and reconstructed 
online (versus static) (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1998; 
McClelland, Rumelhart, & Hinton, 1998; Barsalou, 1982).  That a concept is flexible 
means that new links to different associated concepts can be added and that links 
between established associations can be weakened or strengthened.  That a concept is 
reconstructed online implies that, within some constraints, a change in the context in 
which a concept is activated—that is, a change in the other concept(s) activated 
simultaneously—can influence the momentary representation of that concept (itself, a 
pattern of activations).  A detailed discussion of this stable-but-malleable view of 
representations is beyond the scope of the current discussion (though, see Mitchell, 
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Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Blair, 2002; for an alternative view, see Smith, 1996).  For 
now, it is important to note that flexibility and online reconstruction of representations 
allow for even novel situations to have substantial impacts on what is selectively 
accessible at a given time.  Moreover, and central to the current discussion, habitual 
representations within a particular context can result in an association between the 
representation and the context, such that when that context is encountered in the 
future, the associated representation will become automatically accessible.  A concrete 
example may help to make the point clearer.  Consider, for example, a pool.  Often, a 
pool might be simultaneously activated with say, your home (the context) and leisure.  
Over time, if pool continued to be paired with home and leisure, an increasingly 
stronger link would be built between these concepts.  Thus, when you saw or thought 
about your pool at home, you might feel relaxed.  Now, imagine that there was a pool 
at your gym that you reluctantly used, despite that you feel insecure about being in a 
bathing suit in public.  The concept of pool might then begin to be associated with 
public (the context) and insecurity, and when you encountered a pool in this situation, 
you would tend to feel anxious.  In this way, the concept of pool would become 
associated with conflicting or inconsistent memories and what would ultimately be 
activated—what you would feel or think, and how you would behave upon thinking 
about or seeing a pool—would be determined by the context (i.e., home or public).  
This modulation of activation by situation or context is what researchers have referred 
to as context-dependent activation, with context referring to physical places, 
psychological situations, categories of people, and even abstract concepts (e.g., 
Mitchell et al., 2003; Blair, 2002; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Schwarz, Groves, & 
Schuman, 1998). 
Context-dependent activation has relevance for predicting plausible effects of 
an implicit America reminder.  That is, it has been suggested here, and later evidence 
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will be provided, that America is associated with conflicting information (i.e., both 
egalitarianism and prejudice).  Then, what might determine the content of what is 
activated when one is reminded of America is the context in which that priming 
happens.  While discrimination against many groups has occurred in the U.S., by and 
large bias tends to be perpetrated against non-White groups, and perhaps in particular, 
Blacks.  Thus, over time, one might build associations between America and 
egalitarianism that are qualified by associations between America and prejudice in the 
context of intergroup relations with Blacks and other non-White groups.  The 
argument, then, is that when the concepts of America and African-Americans are 
simultaneously, or closely sequentially, primed, prejudice might be selectively 
activated from among the available associated memories.  As discussed earlier, 
currently activated representations shape attitudes and behavior (e.g., Bargh, 1994; 
2007), and thus, it is likely that the co-activation of Blacks and America would result 
in negative attitudes toward, and bias against, Blacks, which is precisely what is 
predicted. 
Generality of the implicit effects of America cues on bias 
 There are several conditions under which a subtle America cue might be more 
or less likely to cause bias toward non-White ethnic groups.  Variables that might 
impact the effect include the type of measure used, the level of evaluation at which 
prejudice is measured, and which targets are evaluated.  
 Implicit versus explicit measures.  Implicit measures of attitudes and beliefs 
use methods that were developed to measure implicit processes and their outcomes 
(e.g., Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).  The Implicit 
Association Test (IAT), for example, is a tool that is intended to measure attitudes that 
are either introspectively unavailable to a person (i.e., a person is unaware that they 
exist) or that a person may be reluctant to admit to harboring, such as attitudes that 
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violate socially accepted views.  Attitudes that are measured in this way are commonly 
referred to as implicit attitudes.  It is worth mentioning here that the “implicit” in 
“implicit attitudes” has often been used as a description of the attitude itself, or the 
process(es) that produced that attitude, however, more accurately refers to a method of 
measurement that is meant to capture implicit processes, as opposed to either of the 
former (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Payne, 2008).  Alternatively, explicit attitudes are those 
attitudes that are measured explicitly, that is, using measures in which people self-
report their attitudes.  The disadvantages of explicit attitudes measurements include 
what is mentioned above, that individuals may not be aware of their attitudes, or else 
they may be unwilling to report their feelings or attitudes.  In other words, explicit 
measures tend to be subject to a greater amount of controlled, versus impulsive or 
nonconscious, responding (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Payne, 2008).  Given this implicit 
versus explicit distinction in measurement, it may seem as if capturing an effect of a 
subtle American prime would be easiest with an implicit measure.  On the other hand, 
research has shown that bias can be captured on explicit measures, particularly those 
that reduce the potential for reactivity in controlled responding (e.g., Nosek, 
Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007; Fazio & Olson, 2003).  Moreover, some work has found a 
strong correlation between implicit and explicit measures of prejudice (e.g., Nosek et 
al., 2007).  In short, based on this literature, it is unclear whether explicit measurement 
of outcomes can be used to assess bias that results from an America cue; it is an open 
research question (though, see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).  
 Prejudice directed at the group versus the individual.  Another potential 
boundary condition worth investigating is the extent to which the effect of an America 
cue on prejudice might be directed at an individual, as opposed to the group level.  
There is a large body of evidence suggesting that a strong predictor of attitudes and 
behaviors toward individuals is, in fact, attitudes toward the group (e.g., McConnell & 
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Leibold, 2001; Ashburn-Nardo, Knowles, & Monteith, 2003; Hebl & Dovidio, 2005; 
Dovidio & Hebl, 2005; for a review, see Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 
2009).  To take just one example, McConnell and Leibold (2001) found that Whites’ 
attitudes on the IAT predicted the quality of their interactions with Black 
experimenters.  This work suggests that if attitudes toward the group shift, one should 
expect a complementary shift in attitudes and behavior toward individual 
representatives of that group.  There is other research, however, suggesting that a 
distinction between these two levels of attitudes can exist (e.g., Minard, 1952; Olson 
& Fazio, 2003).  In short, this work has found that a person who holds a negative 
attitude toward a given group, may not hold negative attitudes toward particular 
members of that group.   
 As one might have guessed, people tend to hold especially positive attitudes 
toward well-liked or familiar individuals, regardless of their attitudes toward those 
individuals’ groups (Mitchell et al., 2003; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001).  In fact, 
reminding people of well-liked exemplars of a group can improve their momentary 
attitudes toward the entire group (e.g., Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Mitchell et al., 
2003; Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001).  For example, Dasgupta and Greenwald 
(2001) found that presenting participants with what were considered positive 
exemplars of African-Americans, such as Denzel Washington, lead to a temporary 
boost in positive evaluations of Blacks as a group on the IAT.  Coupled with earlier 
work, this study is suggestive of a dissociation between attitudes at the group and 
individual level.  All of this evidence together provides a rather mixed bag; on the one 
hand, group attitudes influence attitudes and behavior toward the group and on the 
other, this correlation is imperfect, and perhaps particularly so for well-liked, familiar 
individuals.  If an America cue increases bias toward African-Americans as a group, it 
is unclear whether that bias will be directed at individuals, or instead, exist only at the 
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group level.  In the absence of strong evidence either in favor or against the potential 
for an America cue to increase bias against individuals, it remains an open question, 
though it is worth noting that 1) presumably attitudes toward individuals, whether 
well-liked or not, are malleable just as group attitudes are malleable, and 2) even if 
attitudes toward well-liked individuals tend to be more static than other attitudes (and 
again, there is little evidence that they are), the attitudes literature in general suggests 
that even strongly endorsed attitudes are not impervious to contextual changes (e.g., 
Wilson & Hodges, 1992).  
Breadth of prejudice effect.  A final potential boundary condition to investigate 
is breadth of the expected bias effect—that is, the extent to which the effect of 
America on bias might be evidenced in ethnic groups besides Black Americans, as 
well as the extent to which this prejudice could result from a reminder of any nation.  
As noted earlier, many groups in America have been subjected to prejudice and 
discrimination.  Arguably, however, it is non-White groups that have been largely at 
the receiving end of such treatment, while historically, discrimination against other 
groups has tended to wax, then eventually fade (e.g., Chin, 2004; Hall, 2010).  If this 
depiction of prejudice in America is accurate, then prejudice and America might be 
cognitively associated for all non-White groups.  That is, given the discussion above 
regarding context-dependent activation, it is likely that when America is activated in 
the context of non-White ethnic groups, prejudice will also be activated, and 
behavioral and attitudinal prejudice might then ensue.  Furthermore, if a connection 
can be drawn between what Devos and Banaji (2005) have termed the 
“America=White” effect—that is, the effect in which America is more closely 
cognitively associated with Whites than any other groups—and the current, predicted 
effect, there is further reason to believe that a reminder of America could increase 
prejudice and negative attitudes toward non-White groups. 
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 Mechanisms of the effect of a subtle America reminder on bias 
 There are several potential mechanisms that might explain how a reminder of 
America could increase bias against non-White groups.  For one, there are potential 
cognitive-affective mechanisms for the predicted effect.  At least one of these 
mechanisms has been discussed at length, namely, the context-dependent activation of 
prejudice when America is primed.  There are other possible cognitive-affective 
mechanisms, for example, the spontaneous activation of negative stereotypes.  A 
cognitive-motivational mechanism is also plausible. Intergroups research, for example, 
has found both that motivation is a contributing factor in prejudice, and that certain 
conditions can increase prejudice-related motives, which in turn, increase bias (e.g., 
Brown & Turner, 1979).  Note, that the different mechanisms need not be mutually 
exclusive, and in fact, likely work in concert to produce the predicted outcome. 
 Cognitive-affective mechanisms.  Here, the term cognitive-affective 
mechanism refers to mechanisms that involve the direct influence of cognitive 
associations on attitudes and behavior.  To some degree, this is a misnomer, as 
developing theory suggests that the effect of associations on behavior and attitudes 
involves a motivational, or goal-related, component—and, at best, the relationship 
between behavior (or attitudes) and motivation is still unclear (e.g., Bargh, 2007; 
Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Cesario, Plaks, & Higgins, 2006).  Nevertheless, the term 
cognitive-affective will be used here in order to ease discussion when comparing and 
contrasting with the cognitive-motivational mechanisms proposed shortly.  
 There is a long history in empirical research connecting stereotyping to 
attitudes and prejudice (e.g., Allport, 1954; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Rudman & 
Ashmore, 2007).  A stereotype is a belief about a group of people.  That these beliefs 
are typically positively or negatively valenced (e.g., lazy, weak) has lead researchers 
to hypothesize, and later empirically support, the relationship between stereotypes and 
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prejudice (though, see Amodio & Devine, 2006).  Studies have found, for example, 
that the ratio of positive to negative stereotypes is correlated with one’s evaluation of a 
group, with higher ratios corresponding with more positive evaluations (e.g., Eagly & 
Mladinic, 1989).  Moreover, priming negative stereotypes associated with a group can 
lead to less favorable evaluations of that individual as well as his or her group, 
regardless of one’s general level of prejudice (e.g., Devine, 1989; Payne, 2005; 
Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Blair, 2001).  Thus, the automatic activation of 
stereotypes is one potential cognitive-affective mechanism of the predicted effect of an 
America cue on prejudice.  If priming America and diverse groups selectively 
activates negative stereotypical conceptualizations of the outgroup (e.g., violent Black 
Americans), or negative stereotypical exemplars of that group, then one may be more 
likely to feel negatively toward that group.  One way in which America might become 
associated with stereotypical versions of groups is through the media (e.g., Entman & 
Rojecki, 2001; Humphrey & Schuman, 1984).  If that is the origin of a connection 
between negative stereotypes and America, then one might expect the effect of an 
America reminder on prejudice to be stronger for those who watch more television and 
have limited contact with Blacks in their personal lives.  Each of these hypotheses is 
tested.     
 Another potential cognitive affective mechanism has been discussed at length, 
namely, the activation of prejudice when America and Black (or other non-White) 
Americans are simultaneously activated.  Added to that is the prediction that 
egalitarianism will be activated when America and Caucasian Americans are 
simultaneously activated.  According to Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006), when a 
concept like America is primed subtly, it will be largely implicitly processed (also see 
Payne, 2008).  According to this view, and implied in similar views, implicit 
processing depends upon associative processes that operate without regard to 
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subjective truth (Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).  It is worth emphasizing that there two important points 
here:  1) the reliance on associative processes, that is, a reliance on the associations 
between concepts in order to produce a response, and 2) the operation of these 
processes without any endorsement of the associations.  Alternatively, when a 
stimulus can be processed more consciously and explicitly, Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen (2006) contend that individuals engage in rule-based processing.  For 
example, if one feels that they dislike a particular group or object (e.g., “I dislike 
insects”), they will compare that feeling to other feelings or beliefs relevant to 
producing a response (“I like nature,” “Insects are a part of nature”, “Insects are a 
necessary part of the ecosystem”).  In this way, individuals engage in proposition 
validity testing in which they determine whether a particular proposition is true by 
comparing it to other, relevant propositions that hold some degree of subjective 
validity, a key difference between associative and rule-based processes.    
 Given a distinction between associative and rule-based processes in implicit 
versus explicit processing, it is predicted that only a subtle, but not a blatant America 
prime will lead to prejudice toward non-White ethnic groups.  If America primes 
prejudice in the context of non-White groups, this should produce a negative 
evaluation (“I dislike African-Americans”), and thus, the prediction for implicit 
priming.  When one is processing America explicitly, however, other propositions 
should be considered in conjunction with this evaluation.  One influential source of 
other relevant propositions is knowledge about others’ beliefs, that is, social norms 
and expectations (Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006).  Most Americans know, for 
example, that America has an espoused commitment to egalitarianism (e.g., Devos and 
Banaji, 2005).  Thus, a plausible way in which people might engage in rule-based 
processes is something like the following:  an initial evaluation based on a negative 
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feeling (“I dislike African-Americans”), is followed by testing of that proposition 
against other salient, informational, and apparently relevant propositions (“Americans 
are egalitarian”, “I am an American”, “I believe all people should be treated equally”), 
resulting in a rejection of the initial proposition, and perhaps even assimilation with 
the perceived norm or expectation.  That is, one might expect more egalitarianism 
toward all ethnic groups when individuals are blatantly primed with America.   
 One nuance predicted by the distinction in processing outlined here is that in 
this case, the manner in which one responds to an implicit America prime (i.e., on an 
implicit versus explicit measure) should be less important than the manner in which 
one processes the American stimulus.  That is, one could argue that a subtle, implicitly 
processed reminder of America should be expected to produce bias on implicit, but not 
explicit measures.  The Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) model contends, 
however, that the default response is to accept one’s initial evaluation (“I dislike 
Blacks”).  Given that individuals should be largely unaware of an America reminder 
when they are subtly primed, they will be absent further America-relevant information 
(i.e., an egalitarian norm relevant to America) against which they could test their 
initial proposition, and thus their initial judgment should carry even on explicit self-
report measures.  To the extent that individuals test their initial proposition against 
other judgment-relevant, but America-irrelevant, information (“I like all people”, 
“Prejudice is wrong”), one might expect a relatively smaller prejudice effect on 
explicit versus implicit measures. 
 Cognitive-motivational mechanisms.  Many theories of modern prejudice and 
its expression suggest that intergroup bias is motivated (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 
Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Brown & Turner, 1979; Crandall & Eshleman, 2004; Gaertner 
& Dovidio, 1986; Devine, 1989).  Self-categorization theory, born out of social 
identity theory, posits that individuals categorize themselves into social groups or 
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categories, which can include established, well-known social groups, such as an ethnic 
group or gender, or can be based on seemingly arbitrary distinctions, such as when 
people are randomly divided into teams (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987; Tajfel, 1982).  This mere categorization of people into groups plants the seed for 
intergroup bias, in that one’s sense of belonging, and therefore, self-esteem becomes 
tied to the group, creating an ingroup protection motive (e.g., Brown & Turner, 1979; 
Tajfel, 1982).  Highlighting a particular identity, or making it salient, can activate the 
ingroup protection motive, and thus increase the likelihood of prejudice against the 
outgroup.  In this view, then, prejudice serves as a means for protecting one’s ingroup, 
which is ultimately in the service of maintaining or enhancing one’s self-esteem.  
 Tajfel (1982) proposed that once people are categorized into groups, the 
salience of their own identity in the presence of outgroup members can activate the 
ingroup protection motive.  He reasoned that this is because the comforting social 
consensus on beliefs and values that an ingroup provides becomes psychologically 
challenged by even implicit awareness of other, potentially contradictory beliefs and 
values (i.e., those held by outgroup members).  Several factors contributing to the 
salience of an identity have been empirically identified, including perceived similarity 
within the group, perceived differentiation between the groups, and perceived extant 
or sudden threatening conflict between the groups; being a part of a group can increase 
the likelihood that one perceives or exaggerates the existence of these factors (e.g., 
Turner et al., 1987; Tajfel, 1982).  Moreover, anything that increases either the 
perceived need for in-group protection, or the value of outgroup discrimination, also 
increases the potential for the expression of prejudice (e.g., Brown & Turner, 1979).  
 Social identity and self-categorization theories provide two ways in which a 
reminder of America could lead to prejudice.  One prediction that follows from these 
theories is that a reminder of America in an intergroup context could increase 
  19 
prejudice if that reminder threatens one’s ingroup (e.g, White), by, for example, 
reminding individuals of intergroup conflict.  That is, America may be cognitively 
associated with intergroup strife, and priming America and diverse groups 
simultaneously might selectively activate such associations, leading to the salience of 
one’s identity in a context that already presumes conflict.  A second prediction based 
upon social identity theory is that a subtle reminder of America does not make one’s 
identity salient via a reminder of a conflict-related threat, but rather through America’s 
cognitive link with being White.  Devos and Banaji (2005) have indeed found that for 
White and Asian Americans, America is closely linked with whiteness.  In other 
words, for a subset of the American population, priming America could serve to prime 
their social group identity, making it salient.  As noted above, the salience of this 
identity might then activate an ingroup protection motive, and induce prejudice. 
 Outline of the current research 
Sixteen experiments are reported demonstrating the effects of processing an 
America cue on attitudes and behavior toward non-White ethnic groups, and in 
particular, African-Americans.  In the second chapter, the effects of implicitly 
processing an America cue are demonstrated using a variety of implicit measures of 
attitudes and prejudice.  In the third chapter, the boundary conditions of this effect are 
explored, including the degree to which bias resulting from implicitly processing a 
reminder of America can be captured on explicit measures, whether bias is directed 
only at the most general level, or also will be targeted at individuals, and the degree to 
which bias is found toward various social groups.  The fourth chapter includes an 
investigation of possible mechanisms of the effect, highlighting why bias might be 
produced when an America cue is implicitly, but not explicitly, processed.  The final 
chapter discusses the implications and limitations of the findings, and suggests future 
directions for the research program. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
IMPLICIT EFFECTS OF AMERICA CUES ON BIAS 
 In this chapter, I report three studies testing the prediction that subtle, 
implicitly processed America cues lead to affective bias toward African-Americans for 
White and Asian Americans native to the United States.  I used two different cues, an 
American flag (Studies 1A, 1B & 2), chosen for its pervasive use as a symbol of 
America, and the letters USA (Study 1B), to test whether the effect was specific to 
particular cues.  In all studies, participants were implicitly primed using a computer 
task in which the cues were flashed below conscious threshold.  Participants’ 
awareness of the priming cues was assessed after the experiment.  I employed two 
implicit measures of bias, an attitudes Implicit Association Test (IAT) and an 
evaluative stereotyping IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998; Rudman & Ashmore, 2007).  
Finally, I test the extent to which the effect might be moderated by individual 
differences, such as gender, nationalism, patriotism, news following, or political 
affiliation. 
Study 1A 
 There is some evidence that explicit processing of an America cue results in 
egalitarianism (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Butz et al., 2007), however, it is possible that 
implicit processing of the same cues could lead to different, even opposite effects, 
such as bias.  These sorts of dissociations have been reported in many social cognitive 
literatures, including the persuasion, decision-making, and attitudes literatures (e.g., 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986;Fitzsimons & Williams, 2000; Fazio et al., 1995).  One 
reason to believe that implicitly processing America cues might lead to bias is that 
America could be associated with a long history of intergroup strife and discrimination 
between Whites and non-White groups.   
  
  21 
 Method 
 Participants 
Thirty-eight White American and Asian American students at Cornell 
University were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (implicit America prime 
versus control prime) in a between-participants design.  
 Stimuli and Procedure  
In the first part of the study, participants completed a decision-making 
computer task ostensibly testing their decision-making ability.  In the task, they were 
implicitly primed with a black and white picture of either an American flag (implicit 
America prime condition; Figure 1) or a flag image that did not resemble any nation’s 
flag (control prime condition; Figure 2).  Participants completed 32 trials of the 
computer task.  Each trial began with an American flag [control] prime presented for 
17ms, followed by a mask presented for 38ms, then a randomly selected target image 
that contained both an A and an L, unequal in size.  Participants were asked to respond 
to the target image by pressing either the a or l key on their keyboards as quickly as 
they could to indicate which letter they believed was larger.    
 IAT measure.  All participants then were informed that they would begin a 
second, unrelated experiment in which they would complete another computer task, 
the Black-White attitudes IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998; see Appendix A for the list of 
stimuli).  In the IAT, participants were given two categories (White and Black) placed 
at the top of the computer screen, on opposites sides of the screen, then asked to 
categorize words into one of those categories (e.g., Jamal).  In the second block of 
trials, participants were given two attributes (positive and negative) and asked to 
complete a similar categorization task with positive and negative words (e.g., 
pleasure).  In the third block, the categories and attributes were paired together (e.g., 
White and positive on one side and Black and negative on the other).  Participants 
  22 
were asked to categorize words from any of the categories or attributes that appear in 
the center of the screen as quickly as possible; words were presented one at a time in 
random order.  In the final two blocks, the pairings were switched and participants 
were asked to complete the categorization task once more, first in practice trials, then 
in real trials.  The extent to which one was quicker to categorize words when White-
positive and Black-negative were paired, relative to the reverse pairing represented a 
measure of pro-White, and anti-Black bias.  The IAT was presented in one of two 
orders, randomly assigned between participants.  In one order, White-positive and 
Black-negative were paired first, and in the other, they were paired second.  There was 
no effect of order (F<0.60).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  The American flag stimulus used during the implicit priming task.  
  
 
 
 
Figure 2.  The control stimulus used during the implicit priming task. 
Self-report measures.  Prior to the start of the IAT, but on the computer, participants 
completed a measure of their mood on the 7-point Positive and Negative Affective 
State (PANAS) scale.  After completing the IAT, participants were asked to respond to 
individual difference items, including their gender, age, ethnicity, grade point average 
(GPA), and political group affiliation.  Finally, participants completed a measure of 
political news following, given recent findings in which news following was an 
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important, moderating factor in the effects of an America prime (Ferguson & Hassin, 
2007).  Participants reported their political party affiliation on 7-point Likert scales, 
ranging from 1 (Republican) to 7 (Democrat) and reported how often they followed 
political news on 7-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (Rarely) to 7 (Very often).  
Lastly, participants were probed for suspicion. 
 Results  
 I found that implicitly processing an America cue, in this case, the American 
flag, increased bias toward African-Americans on an implicit measure, relative to a 
control condition.  On the IAT, a D’ score is calculated, representing an index of the 
relative speed with which participants perform the categorizations during one versus 
the other set of pairings.  D’ also accounts for error rates, task engagement, and 
individual differences in response rate tendencies.  Participants who were primed with 
the American flag evidenced greater bias against African-Americans (M=.67) than 
those in the control condition (M=.37), with higher scores reflecting greater ease in 
categorizing when White-positive and Black-negative were paired relative to the 
alternative pairing t(36)=2.36, p=.02, d=.78.  Mood did not differ by condition 
[t(36)=0.42, ns] and did not interact with the effect of the priming condition on bias 
[F(1, 34)=0.01, ns].  Political news following did not moderate the main effect 
(F<.11).  No other individual difference factor modulated the main effect (all Fs<.56).   
 No participants in the implicit America prime condition reported awareness of 
the American flag.  No participant in either condition guessed the hypotheses of the 
experiment, nor did anyone accurately connect the first priming task with the second 
evaluation task. 
 Discussion 
 This study represents an initial test of the hypothesis that an implicitly 
processed America cue will lead to prejudice.  The results support this hypothesis, 
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with White and Asian American participants expressing greater prejudice towards 
Blacks after being implicitly primed with the American flag.  There are some 
limitations to this design.  For example, given the features of the IAT task, it is not 
possible to know whether outgroup denigration, ingroup positivity, or both increased.  
These possibilities are investigated in later studies.   
 The next study addresses a concern regarding the nature of the manipulation.  
Namely, it could be that the American flag carries with it specific associations.  If that 
were true, rather than priming America, the experimental task could be priming some 
subset of America associations specific to the American flag, or alternatively, unique 
associations that do not overlap with America associations.  To test the possibility that 
the American flag, rather than America, causes bias, a third condition is added in 
Study 1B in which participants are primed with the letters, USA. 
Study 1B 
 There are a number of symbols used to represent America; it is possible that 
while these symbols are associated with America, they do not activate the same 
representation as a more general America prime.  The Statue of Liberty may be 
particularly associated with freedom and plurality, for example.  While the prevalence 
of the flag as a symbol of America, across situations, implies a strong overlap in the 
representations primed by the flag versus America, there is still a possibility that they 
differ in a meaningful way.  This potential issue with using a symbol to prime 
America is addressed empirically in this study. 
 Method 
 Participants 
One hundred thirty-four White American and Asian American students at 
Cornell University were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (implicit 
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American flag prime, implicit USA prime, or control prime) in a between-participants 
design.  
 Stimuli and Procedure  
The procedure for Study 1B was nearly identical to that used for Study 1A, 
with two exceptions.  First, a third condition was added in which participants were 
primed with the letters, USA.  Second, there were new stimuli used in the prime task.  
In this experiment, participants responded to target images of either trees or plants and 
were asked to indicate whether the target picture was a tree or a plant by pressing the t 
or p key, respectively, on their keyboards.  All other aspects of the computer tasks and 
procedure of this study were the same as those described in Study 1A. 
 Results 
 The order in which the IAT was administered did not influence the results (F 
<1.45).  As in Study 1A, priming participants with an America cue, whether the 
American flag or USA, increased bias toward African-Americans as measured by the 
IAT, F(2, 132)=4.51, p=.01.  A D’ score was calculated for each condition.  The 
American flag condition (M=.57) did not differ from the USA condition (M=.57) 
[t(89)=.11, ns], however, the control condition (M=.37) significantly differed from 
both the American flag condition [t(89)=2.85, p<.01] and the USA condition 
[t(86)=2.32, p<.05].  Mood did not differ by condition (F<.70) and did not interact 
with the effect of the priming condition on bias (F=.78).  None of the individual 
difference variables moderated the effects (all Fs<.1.28).  
 None of the participants primed with an America cue reported awareness of 
having been exposed to an America cue.  Moreover, no participant in any condition 
correctly identified the true nature of the experiment, or the connection between the 
tasks. 
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 Discussion 
 Together with Study 1A, these results offer evidence that White and Asian 
American participants exhibit greater prejudice on an implicit measure toward Blacks 
after  implicitly processing America-related cues.  Prejudice, so far, has been 
demonstrated on an attitudes IAT.  In the next study, bias is measured using an 
evaluative stereotyping IAT. 
Study 2 
 Prejudice is an affective, evaluative judgment that might also be captured in 
individuals’ stereotyping.  Evaluative stereotyping, in particular, is correlated with 
prejudice, because as its name implies, it is closely tied with affect (e.g., Rudman, 
Ashmore, & Gary, 2001; Rudman & Ashmore, 2007).  Nevertheless, there is evidence 
that evaluative stereotyping is a distinct construct.  For example, in one study, both the 
attitudes IAT and the evaluative stereotype IAT predicted self-reported feelings and 
moderate and nonverbal behaviors, however, only the evaluative stereotype IAT 
predicted unique variance in overt biased behavior (e.g., the use of slurs) after 
controlling for explicit attitudes (Rudman & Ashmore, 2007).  In other words, if the 
effect of the American flag on bias is evidenced on an evaluative stereotyping 
measure, it would 1) demonstrate that the effect extends to evaluative stereotyping, 
and 2) expand the scope of the type of behavioral bias one could expect to be induced 
by an implicit America reminder. 
 Method 
 Participants 
Thirty-one White American and Asian American at Cornell University were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions (implicit America prime versus control 
prime) in a between-participants design.  
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 Stimuli and Procedure  
In the first part of the experiment, participants completed the same computer 
priming task described in Study 1B, in which participants were asked to categorize 
pictures as plants or trees.  The task was used as a cover in order to prime participants 
with either the American flag (implicit flag prime condition) or generic flag (control 
prime condition).  
 IAT measure.  All participants then completed an evaluative stereotyping IAT 
as part of an ostensibly unrelated experiment (Rudman et al., 2001; see Appendix B 
for the list of stimuli).  The procedure in the Black-White evaluative stereotyping IAT 
is nearly identical to that used for the Black-White attitudes IAT, using the same 
category and attribute labels, but different target words.  The target words in the 
evaluative stereotyping IAT include only negative Black, and positive White, 
stereotypes.  
 Self-report measures.  After completing the IAT, participants were asked to 
respond to the same individual difference items as presented in Studies 1A and 1B, 
including gender, age, ethnicity, grade point average (GPA), political group affiliation, 
and political news following.  Lastly, participants were probed for suspicion. 
 Results  
 The order in which the IAT was presented did not impact the results (F<.70).  
Implicitly processing the America cue increased evaluative stereotyping of African-
Americans relative to the control condition.  Participants who were primed with the 
American flag demonstrated greater evaluative stereotyping of African-Americans 
(M=.55) than those in the control condition (M=.31), with higher scores reflecting 
greater ease in categorizing words when White-positive and Black-negative were 
paired relative to the alternative pairing, t(29)=2.25, p<.05, d=.85.  No individual 
difference variables moderated the effect of prime condition on bias (all Fs<.92).   
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 No participants in the implicit America prime condition reported awareness of 
the American flag.  No participants correctly guessed the relationship between the 
tasks, nor did anyone accurately predict the results. 
 Discussion 
 Taken with Studies 1A and 1B, these results suggest that the effect of 
implicitly processing America on bias is robust, at least on implicit measures.  Study 
1A established that an effect of subtly priming America on bias exists, and that it 
differs from the effects previously demonstrated using more blatant America 
reminders (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2005; Butz et al., 2007).  The prejudice effect found 
here is consistent with the contention that the effect of America on bias is context—
that is, group—dependent, though is not conclusive given that the social groups were 
presented within-group, rather than between-group.  Study 1B replicated the implicit 
effect of America on bias and demonstrated that the effect in Study 1A was not an 
artifact of using the American flag to prime America.  In this study, the effect on bias 
was the same whether an American flag prime, or a more pure America prime, was 
used.  Study 2 extended the findings of the previous two studies by demonstrating that 
an America cue also influenced evaluative stereotyping.  Though the evaluative 
stereotyping measure has some overlap with the attitudes measure used in the first two 
studies, research has shown that evaluative stereotyping is a distinct construct, with 
differential predictive value for behaviors.   
 In the next chapter, I explore the generality of the America reminder effect, 
this time investigating whether explicit attitudes will be affected by a subtle America 
reminder, as well as whether features of the target influence the presence or magnitude 
of the effect. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
GENERALITY  
Five studies are reported in this chapter, each investigating the generality of the 
implicit effects of America cues on bias demonstrated in the last chapter.  Generality, 
here, refers to the range of empirical (and by implication, real life) conditions under 
which the implicit effect of America on bias might be found.  For example, while 
implicitly processing an America cue seems to increase bias on implicit measures, 
whether that bias will be captured on explicit measures is an open question.  A variety 
of self-report measures are used to address just this question, including measures of 
attitudes and beliefs (Studies 3 and 7), interpersonal closeness (Study 4), and 
behavioral intentions (Studies 5 and 6).  In addition, these studies employ a new 
method of implicit priming in which the American cue is visible, but subtle, testing the 
degree to which perception of the stimulus is important.  If the effect is unchanged by 
this manipulation, it would point to the ecological validity of this effect, given that one 
is likely to encounter America cues in a visible, but subtle manner. 
In addition, this chapter investigates the extent to which attitudes toward the 
individual, in addition to the group, are affected by an America cue (Study 5).  It could 
be that attitudes toward the abstract outgroup become more negative after implicitly 
processing a reminder of America, but attitudes toward the individual remain 
unchanged.  Some studies have found that a discrepancy between group and individual 
attitudes exists (e.g., Olson & Fazio, 2003), while others identify a strong relationship 
between group and individual attitudes (e.g., McConnell & Leibold, 2001).  Even if 
group level attitudes are predictive of individual level attitudes, features of the target, 
such as familiarity and favorability, could attenuate the relationship.  Some work is 
suggestive of this possibility, and it is directly tested in Study 6, using a quite famous 
and well-liked exemplar, President Barack Obama. 
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Finally, tests of the breadth of the effect are included.  In Study 7, I examine 
which social groups are affected by a subtle America reminder.  If the effect is based 
on the associations one has made between America and prejudice, it is likely that bias 
will be directed toward many non-White groups.  As noted earlier, however, the 
prototypical example of bias in America is that directed toward Blacks, and as such, 
the effects could be specific to that group.  In Study 8, I test whether the effects are 
specific to America, or whether alternatively, being reminded of any nation would 
render these effects. 
Study 3 
In the next studies, I examine the effect of an implicit America reminder on 
explicit measures of attitudes.  On the one hand, there is evidence that implicit and 
explicit measures diverge on their ability to capture existing bias given that implicit 
measures are largely immune to the issues with explicit measures, such as a reluctance 
to admit bias (e.g., Payne, 2008; Blair, 2001; Fazio et al., 1995).  On the other hand, 
scores on implicit measures are strong predictors of responses on explicit measures 
(e.g., Rudman & Ashmore, 2001, Greenwald et al., 1998; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 
1997).  Moreover, according to recent theory in this area, controlled, explicit 
responses are the result of propositional reasoning.  In many cases, this sort of 
reasoning can result in a rejection of one’s initial affective reaction based upon a 
comparison of the validity of that evaluation with other contradictory, subjectively 
valid propositions.  In the present case, however, a feeling of negativity toward Blacks 
when primed with an American flag might be tested against propositions relating to 
one’s general feelings about prejudice, but given the subtly of the America prime, and 
the presumed unawareness of its presence or effects, one should not engage in validity 
testing against propositions relating to the flag (for further discussion of issues 
surrounding correction of controlled response also see, Wilson & Brekke, 1994). 
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Method 
 Participants 
 Sixty-one White American, Asian American, and Latino American students at 
the University of Ohio were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (implicit 
America prime versus control) in a between-participants design. 
 Stimuli and Procedure  
 All participants completed surveys containing both the manipulation and 
dependent measure.  Each of the surveys began with a page titled “Geography and 
Daylight”, which contained four black and white pictures of various scenes (Appendix 
C).  In the implicit flag prime condition, two of the four pictures included American 
flags as part of the scene.  In addition, all subsequent pages of the surveys contained .4 
x .6 inch American flag icons in the upper left-hand corner.  In the control condition, 
the flags were digitally removed from the “Geography and Daylight” page, and no flag 
icons appeared on any page of the survey.  Participants were asked to identify the time 
during which the scenes were photographed, which served as the cover task for the 
manipulation. 
 Immediately following the “Geography and Daylight” task, participants’ 
explicit attitudes were measured using the Attitudes Toward Blacks scale (Brigham, 
1977; Appendix D).  The scale was presented in a fixed order.  Participants indicated 
their agreement with a number of statements about their attitudes toward, and beliefs 
about, African-Americans on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).  Items were reverse scored if necessary such that 
higher scores indicated more negativity toward Blacks.   
 Participants again completed individual difference items, including their 
gender, age, ethnicity, GPA, political news watching, and political group affiliation.  
In addition, participants were asked how proud they were of being American and how 
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much they identified with being American, on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 
(Not at all) to 7 (Very much).  Participants were asked to report on 7-point Likert 
scales how many Blacks they knew, how much contact they had with Blacks when 
they were younger (both ranging from 1 (None) to 7 (A lot)), and how well they knew 
their Black acquaintances, on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very well).  
 Results  
 As predicted, implicit processing of the American flag resulted in more biased 
reactions toward African-Americans (M=2.57) compared with those in the control 
condition (M=2.10), t(59)=2.13, p=.04, d=.55.  There were no moderating effects of 
gender, age, ethnicity, GPA, political news following, or political group affiliation (all 
Fs<1.61).  Pride about, and identification with, the United States did not influence the 
results, nor did endorsement of African-American stereotypes predict, or interact with, 
the effect of the American flag on explicit attitudes.  In each of the studies using this 
measure, the Black contact items were highly correlated (all rs>0.45), justifying the 
creation of the composite score in which the amount of contact with Blacks was 
calculated by averaging the scores of the three questions about contact with Blacks.  
Contact with Blacks did not moderate the stated results (F<.97). 
 Discussion 
 The results of this experiment suggest that an implicit reminder of America 
does, in fact, influence bias on explicit measures.  The smaller effect size in this study 
relative to the first three studies could suggest that people are engaging in controlled 
responding (though, uninfluenced by America-related factors).  It could also suggest 
something about the explicit measure itself, or could simply be the product of chance.  
In the next experiment, one’s feelings of interpersonal closeness with Blacks versus 
Whites are measured.  This study again examines whether bias will be reported on 
explicit measures and also identifies a possible behavioral consequence of this effect.  
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In addition, unlike the former studies in which a relative effect was reported (Studies 
1A, 1B, 2) or attitudes toward only Blacks were reported (Study 3), the next study 
independently assesses reactions toward Whites. 
Study 4 
 Method 
 Participants 
 Sixty White American and Asian American students at Cornell University 
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (implicit America prime versus 
control) in a between-participants design.  
 Stimuli and Procedure  
 All participants completed surveys containing both the manipulation and 
dependent measure.  In the experimental condition, a .4 x .6 inch American flag icon 
appeared in the upper left-hand corner.  In the control condition, no flags were present 
on the survey.  Participants were approached on campus and asked to complete a 
short, one page survey.  The scale of Perceived Interpersonal Closeness (Appendix E; 
Popovic, Milne, & Barrett, 2003) appeared on the front page of the survey.  In the 
task, there were six concentric circles, with the following labels listed from the outer 
most circle to the inner most circle:  Distant, Neither Close Nor Distant, A Little Bit 
Close, Moderately Close, Very Close, Fully Close, and Self.  Participants were asked 
to indicate how close they felt at that moment to African-Americans and White-
Americans by writing AA and WA, respectively, within one of the circles.  Responses 
closer to the center of the circle indicated greater feelings of closeness.  Participants 
were also asked to report their gender, age, ethnicity, and GPA.  
 Results  
 The subtle America cue decreased feelings of closeness toward African-
Americans, but not White Americans, relative to a control condition.  In the following 
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analyses, lower values on the Perceived Interpersonal Closeness scale represent 
greater feelings of closeness.  There was a main effect of race [F(1, 58)=41.64, 
p<.001] that was qualified by a condition x race interaction  [F(1, 58)=6.88, p=.01; 
Figure 3].  Feelings of closeness toward Blacks were significantly less in the implicit 
prime condition (M=3.32) than the control condition [(M=2.56); t(58)=2.30, p<.05].  
Feelings of closeness toward Whites did not significantly differ by prime condition 
(t(58=.93, ns).  There were no moderating effects of gender, age, ethnicity, or GPA 
(all Fs<1.61).  
Figure 3.  Feelings of interpersonal closeness with Whites and Blacks.  Lower values 
represent greater feelings of closeness to the self. 
 Discussion 
 Taken together, the results of Studies 3 and 4 suggest that an implicit reminder 
of America can influence bias on explicit measures.  Study 4 adds another possible 
consequence of these feelings of negativity: feelings of distance between oneself and 
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another group.  These feelings of distance from other social groups have been noted in 
prejudice and stereotyping literature, representing a tendency to avoid (as opposed to 
approach) outgroups (e.g., Amodio & Devine, 2006).  They are also consistent with 
social identity theory’s predictions of differentiation after self-categorization into 
social groups, though one might also expect increased feelings of closeness with one’s 
ingroup based on that theory (e.g., Brown & Turner, 1979).  One possible explanation 
is that there is a ceiling effect for White reactions in this study.  Other studies will 
again address the possibility of an effect on attitudes toward Whites.  For now, I turn 
to examining the extent to which attitudes toward Blacks as a group will be reflected 
in attitudes and behaviors toward individual members of that group. 
Study 5 
 Will the implicit effects of America on attitudes extend to attitudes and 
behaviors toward the individual?  Research on attitudes is mixed, with some evidence 
suggesting that attitudes at an abstract, or general, level do not predict behavior at the 
concrete, or specific level (Weigel & Neuman, 1976; Regan & Fazio, 1977; for a 
review, see Kraus, 1995).  Moreover, Olson and Fazio (2003) concluded that the IAT, 
in particular, measures attitudes toward the group, but not the individual (though, see 
Mitchell et al., 2003).  Alternatively, there is a large body of evidence finding that 
attitudes toward a group are a strong predictor of intergroup attitudes and behavior at 
the individual level (e.g., McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2003; 
Dovidio & Hebl, 2005).  This question is tested directly in the next study.  
 Method 
 Participants 
 Ninety-nine White and Asian American students at Cornell University were 
randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (implicit America prime versus control) x 2 
(White versus Black) between-groups design.  
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 Stimuli and Procedure  
 All participants completed surveys containing both the manipulation and 
dependent measures.  Participants in all conditions read about a new peer counseling 
program started in Ithaca, New York, as well as the desired qualifications to join the 
program.  They then read a transcript from an interview with a candidate for a position 
in the peer counseling program.  The materials were designed to closely match the 
“ambiguous qualifications” condition in Dovidio and Gaertner (2000), in which a 
candidate is qualified, but not a perfect match for the position.  Ambiguous 
qualifications allow for more subjectivity when evaluating a candidate.  Gaertner and 
Dovidio (1986) reasoned in their aversive racism theory that it is only in ambiguous 
situations that individuals will feel the liberty to act on their (nonconscious or 
conscious) bias.  Evaluating a well-qualified person poorly, especially, would violate 
most individuals desire to appear unbiased.   
 The candidate in the interview was either a White male or a Black male, and a 
picture was included so that the participants could identify the candidate’s race.  The 
name of the candidate was Alexander Jones across race conditions.  In the implicit 
prime condition, two .4 x .6 in American flags surrounded the heading “Peer 
Counselor Study” on the top of the page.  In the control condition, the heading 
appeared alone. 
 After reading the description of the program and interview excerpt, participants 
were then asked to evaluate the candidate on several dimensions.  Participants 
indicated how qualified and desirable they believed the candidate to be on 10-point 
Likert scales, ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 10 (Extremely).  Next, they made a 
decision about whether to recommend the candidate for the position, and then 
indicated the strength of their preference on a 10-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 
(Not at all) to 10 (Very Strong).  Participants were asked to respond to several 
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questions about the candidate, including, the candidate’s perceived mood on a 10-
point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Negative) to 10 (Positive), the perceived 
attractiveness of the candidate, on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not 
Attractive) to 10 (Very Attractive), and finally, the perceived age of the candidate. 
 Results  
 The results showed that bias induced by an implicit America cue can be 
directed at individuals.  A composite score was created for the qualification and 
desirability ratings of the candidate, r(99)=.89, p<.001.  There was a significant prime 
x race condition interaction in the prediction of this composite, F(1, 95)=5.31, p<.05 
(Figure 4).  Participants rated the Black candidate as significantly less qualified and 
desirable in the implicit cue condition (M=4.88) than in the control condition 
[(M=6.10; t(48)=2.19, p<.05].  Ratings of the White candidate’s qualifications and 
desirability did not vary by prime condition, t(47)=.95, ns.  Participants hiring 
decisions differed by prime condition for Blacks [χ2=3.8, p<.05], though no individual 
cell reached significance (all zs<1.1, ns).  No such preferences were observed for 
decisions to hire White candidates across prime condition [χ2=.001, ns].  There was a 
marginal race x prime condition interaction for recommendation strength [F(1, 
95)=2.83, p=.10], though this trend disappeared if only those choosing to hire the 
candidate were considered [F(1, 56)=1.26, ns].  There were no main effects or 
interactions involving ratings of mood, attractiveness, or age of the candidate 
(F’s<2.1, ns).  Likewise, controlling for these variables did not affect the results of the 
study.   
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Figure 4.  Ratings of perceived degree of qualification and desirability of a White and 
Black peer counselor job candidate.   
 Discussion 
 Study 5 provides initial evidence that the influence of an America cue on bias 
is found at both the group and individual level.  Here, participants were asked to 
evaluate a candidate and make a hiring decision based on those evaluations.  An 
incidental flag in the corner of their response sheets influenced the extent to which 
they found the Black, but not White, candidate to be a good fit for the position, as well 
as their ultimate decision to hire the candidate or not.  This finding speaks to the 
impact of such a subtle change in environment on important, significant decisions.  
This study again finds that there is negligible impact on attitudes about, and behaviors 
directed toward, Whites, despite that in the present study, there was no potential for a 
ceiling effect, given that average ratings for Caucasians on the desirability and 
qualification composite score were just above the mid-range on the scale (M=6.55).   
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 The effects found here were not explained by perceptions of mood or 
attraction.  Thus, an America prime does not seem to change perceptions of these 
features of targets.  In the following study, I examine whether a non-physical feature 
of a target influences these effects.  
Study 6 
 In Study 6, I sought to investigate whether evaluating a familiar and well-liked 
individual would eliminate the effect of an implicit America cue on attitudes.  There 
are at least two reasons to believe that the present effect would be attenuated when 
evaluating a well-liked individual.  For one, people tend to hold positive attitudes 
toward familiar, popular individuals, even if they hold affectively negative attitudes 
toward the individual’s group as a whole (Mitchell et al., 2003; Wittenbrink et al., 
2001).  Moreover, simply reminding individuals of a well-liked exemplar can affect 
attitudes toward the whole group, suggesting that there may be a competing, positive 
force in evaluations of well-like and familiar targets (e.g., Dasgupta & Greenwald, 
2001).  There is evidence, however, that even well-known, well-liked individuals will 
be evaluated negatively if one has negative attitudes toward the group (e.g., 
DeHouwer, 2001).  In the following study, participants evaluated one of the most 
famous African-American males, President Barack Obama.  At the time when the 
study was conducted, the now president was a candidate for the Democratic Party in 
the national election.  During this time, his rapid rise to fame was met with an equally 
rapid rise in liking and popularity among voters.  Thus, using President Barack Obama 
as the target for evaluation posed an especially strong test of this question.  Rather 
than evaluating liking, participants reported their support for presidential nominees. 
 Method  
 Participants 
 One hundred seventy-eight White American, Asian American, and Latino 
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American students at the University of Ohio were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions (implicit America prime versus control no prime) in a between-participants 
design.   
 Stimuli and Procedure  
 All participants completed surveys measuring voting intentions.  In the implicit 
America prime condition, each page of the survey contained a .4 x .6 inch American 
flag in the upper left-hand corner of the first page of the survey, while the control 
condition surveys did not contain any American flags.  This study was conducted in 
the final months of 2008, during which time President Barack Obama and Senator 
John McCain were both nominees for their respective parties in the United States 
presidential elections.  On the first page, participants indicated their support for each 
of the candidates on an 8-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (Do not support) to 7 
(Strongly support).   
 Next, participants reported their age, gender, ethnicity, and GPA.  They also 
reported their political identification as a Republican, Democrat, independent, 
conservative, and liberal on individual 8-point Likert scales, ranging from 0 (None) to 
7 (Strong identification), their personal endorsement of socialism versus capitalism on 
a 10-point scale, ranging from 1 (Support socialism) to 10 (Support capitalism), and 
their religiosity on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 10 (Very 
strong).   
 Results  
 Using a repeated measures analysis, I found a significant priming condition x 
candidate interaction, F(1,176)=6.02, p<.05.  Despite the popularity of President 
Barack Obama, the American flag still significantly decreased support for him in the 
implicit America prime condition (M=3.49), compared with the control condition 
[M=4.21; t(177)=2.05, p=.04, d=.31].  Moreover, those who were implicitly primed 
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with the American flag reported more support for Senator John McCain (M=3.95), 
than those in the control condition, [M=3.05; t(176)=2.50, p=.01, d=.38].  There were 
no moderating effects of any of the individual difference variables (all Fs<2.96).   
 Discussion 
The results demonstrated that relative to a control condition, support for a 
Black candidate, Barack Obama, decreased when participants were implicitly primed 
with an America cue.  There was a smaller effect size in this study relative to other 
studies reported, most likely at least partially due to the explicit nature of the response 
measure, but perhaps also due to the influence of familiarity and liking on attitudes, 
and here, support.  One potential question to be addressed by future research is the 
extent to which personally knowing an individual could dampen the bias effect found 
here.  
Support for a White candidate, John McCain, also increased when implicitly 
primed with an America cue relative to the control condition.  This effect for White 
Americans, whether evaluating individuals or the group, is not found in any other 
study reported in this research program.  One viable explanation is that in the context 
of politics, an America reminder could be uniquely influential.  For example, a 
reminder of America could influence other relevant beliefs in this context, like one’s 
support for conservative beliefs, for which Senator McCain might stand.  Note, that if 
this were true, participants in the prime condition should have been more likely to 
support conservatism than those in the control condition, or alternatively, conservative 
participants might be especially like to increase support for John McCain in the flag 
condition; neither of these related predictions were supported by the data.  Another 
possible explanation is that Senator John McCain was more closely associated with 
America, especially during the election, when his service to the country was 
spotlighted, and words like “real American” were strategically used to distinguish 
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members of the Republican Party from members of the Democratic Party.  If so, 
processing Senator John McCain could have been more fluent—that is more 
cognitively easy to process—which has been shown to lead to more positivity.  
Processing fluency indeed influences similar types of affective judgments (for a 
review, see Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003).   
 While there are still some questions about effects at the group versus 
individual level, Studies 5 and 6 collectively demonstrated that the implicit effects of 
an America reminder impacted individuals, even if they were familiar and popular.  In 
the final studies in this chapter, the breadth of the effect is examined. 
Study 7 
 In the next study, I consider the breadth of the implicit effects of an America 
reminder in two ways.  That is, I examine whether, and if so, which, other social 
groups will be evaluated more negatively after a reminder of America.  Many different 
non-White and White groups have been subjected to prejudice in the United States 
(e.g., Chin, 2004).  It is argued here that while Black-White strife might be the 
prototypical example of bigotry in the United States, other groups, and in particular, 
non-White groups have endured discrimination in the U.S.  To the extent that this 
effect may be largely based in the phenomenon of pattern activation, and that non-
White social groups provide a context in which America is associated with prejudice, 
the America cue should result in bias toward these groups.      
 Method 
 Participants 
 One hundred nine White and Asian American students at Cornell University 
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (implicit America prime versus 
control) in a between-groups design.  
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 Stimuli and Procedure  
 All participants completed surveys containing both the manipulation and 
dependent measures.  In the implicit prime condition, a .4 x .6in American flag was 
place in the upper left-hand corner of the page, while no flags appeared on the control 
version of the survey.  Participants were asked to complete a Feelings Thermometer, 
on which they indicated how warmly they felt toward a diverse set of social groups, on 
a scale ranging from 1 (Not at all warm) to 100 (Extremely warm).  There were ethnic 
social groups (White, Mexican, Black, Arab) and non-ethnic social groups (teachers, 
lawyers, models, athletes, Harvard Students, Cornell Students) included on the survey.  
After indicating feelings toward each group, participants responded to demographic 
and individual difference items, including gender, age, ethnicity, GPA, political 
ideologies, political news watching, American pride, and American identification.  
 Results  
 Using a repeated measures analysis, the main effect of social group was 
significant [F(9, 91)=19.89, p<.001], and a marginal race x prime condition interaction 
approached significance [Figure 5; F(9, 91)=1.75, p=.09].  There were significant 
effects for each of the non-White ethnic groups, such that feelings of warmth were 
depressed in the implicit America condition, but not the control condition.  Thus, for 
Blacks, evaluations were more negative in the implicit flag condition (M=63.00) than 
the control condition [M=72.50; t(99)=2.37, p<.05].  The same was true for Mexicans 
in the implicit flag condition (M=61.67), as compared to the control condition 
[M=70.83; t(101)=2.13, p<.05].  The lowest feelings of warmth were for Arabs in the 
implicit prime condition (M=58.27), though they were evaluated significantly less 
negatively in the control condition [M=68.17; t(99)=2.31, p<.05)].  Feelings of warmth 
did not differ across conditions for any other social group, including Whites (all 
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ts<1.09).  Including individual difference variables in the analyses did not change the 
results (all Fs<1.2). 
Figure 5.  Feelings of warmth toward various social groups reported on a  Feelings 
Thermometer. 
 Discussion 
 Study 7 finds support for the prediction that implicit effects of America on bias 
will be evidenced for non-White social groups.  This prediction extends from the 
earlier argument that implicit effects of America could be due to context-dependent 
activation—and in particular, that priming America while simultaneously priming 
non-White ethnic groups could selectively activate prejudice.  These findings also 
suggest some specificity.  While ethnic outgroups were affected by an America prime, 
another social outgroup (Harvard Students) was not.  This finding resonates with 
intuition:  if there is a distinct history of bias for or against Harvard students in 
America, it is not clearly connected to American Cornell students, it is not well-
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known, and it does not feel as readily available as the history of interethnic conflict in 
America.  This finding is also consistent with two possible explanations of the effect.  
That is, according to social identity theory (eg., Tajfel, 1982), reminding students that 
they are Cornellians should impact their overall ratings of a relevant outgroup 
(Harvard students) but there is no reason why this effect should be influenced by 
exposure to an America cue.  In terms of a cognitive-affective explanation, priming 
America in the context of Harvard students should not activate prejudice given that 
bias related to Harvard students is unlikely to be associated with America. 
Study 8 
The final study in this chapter investigates whether the effects reported thus far 
are specific to America, or whether instead, priming any nation would result in 
prejudice toward particular groups.  There is a small possibility, for example, that 
rather than priming something specific to America, an America cue is priming 
“nation”, in which case, priming any nation will produce the same results.  In the 
following study, a condition is added in which Canada, another well-known nation, is 
primed. 
 Method 
 Participants 
 Seventy-five White and Asian American students at Cornell University were 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions (implicit American flag prime, implicit 
Canadian flag prime, or control) in a between-groups design.  
 Stimuli and Procedure  
 All participants completed surveys containing both the manipulation and 
dependent measures.  In the implicit America prime condition, a .4 x .6 in. American 
flag was place in the upper left-hand corner of the page; in the implicit Canada prime 
condition, a .4 x .6 in. Canadian flag was place in the upper left-hand corner of the 
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page.   No flags appeared on the control version of the questionnaire.  Participants 
were asked to complete a Feelings Thermometer, on which they indicated how warmly 
they felt toward Whites and Blacks on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at all warm) to 100 
(Extremely warm).  After indicating feelings toward each group, participants 
responded to demographic and individual difference items, including gender, age, 
ethnicity, GPA, political ideologies, political news watching, American pride, 
American identification, contact with Whites and contact with Blacks.  
 Results  
 An interaction between prime condition and ethnicity emerged, F(2, 72)=5.30, 
p<.01.  Attitudes toward Blacks varied by condition [F(2, 72)=3.04, p=.05], while 
attitudes toward Whites did not [F(2, 72)=.59, ns].  In particular, attitudes toward 
Blacks in the implicit America prime condition (M=58.77) were marginally more 
negative than in the control condition [M=73.73; t(50)=1.91, p=.06], and significantly 
more negative than in the implicit Canadian prime condition [M=74.74; t(47)=2.01, 
p=.05].  Attitudes toward Blacks in the control condition did not differ from attitudes 
toward Blacks in the implicit Canada prime condition, t(47)=.17, ns.  A composite 
score was created for the Black and White contact items (all rs>.49).  Neither contact 
composite score moderated the effects.  Likewise, no individual difference or 
demographic items influenced the results of the study (all Fs<1.49).  Five participants 
spontaneously expressed suspicion about the Canadian flag prime; leaving these 
participants in the analyses did not change the results of the study. 
 Discussion 
 The results of this study offer some evidence that priming America, rather than 
any nation, produces a bias effect.  A variety of other control conditions could have 
been used, however, this study provides at least initial evidence that the effects found 
so far have been specific to an America prime.  This finding is important because it 
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establishes a precondition for the proposed mechanisms.  In particular, it is proposed 
that the effect is dependent upon prejudice and “White” associations specific to 
America.  
Taken together, the studies in this chapter suggest that the implicit effects of 
America on attitudes are robust, can be found under a variety of conditions, and can 
affect a number of groups.  In this way, this chapter addresses both the generality of 
the effect—that is, the empirical and real life conditions under which the effect is 
likely to be found—and the generalizability of the findings—the extent to which the 
effect can be expected to occur in other situations, for other groups, in everyday life.  
Each of the studies expanded upon the types of behaviors that an implicit America 
prime could affect.  For example, explicit attitude measures (Studies 3) are correlated 
with open, and verbal prejudice measures (e.g., Fazio et al., 1995).  Likewise, a variety 
of other explicit outcomes were affected, including interpersonal closeness and 
feelings (Studies 4, 7 and 8), evaluations and hiring decisions (Study 5), and support 
and liking (Study 6), suggesting that real life behavior could be impacted in a wide 
variety of situations in which one might encounter diversity.  Moreover, a new method 
of priming was included that likely reproduced, in a face valid way, the method in 
which one is likely to encounter a reminder of America in real life.   
Studies 5 and 6 found that group level and individual level attitudes were 
influenced by an implicit America cue, even if the targets of evaluation were familiar 
and well-liked.  In Study 7, I found that non-White ethnic groups, but no other social 
groups, were affected by an implicit America prime and in Study 8, I found that 
priming America, but not Canada influenced evaluations of African-Americans.  Thus, 
Studies 7 and 8 shed light on the specificity of the effect.  It is worth mentioning that 
Studies 7 and 8 are consistent with both cognitive-affective and cognitive-motivational 
explanations of the effect.  In the next chapter, these mechanisms are directly tested.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MECHANISMS 
 In this chapter, the potential mechanisms of the implicit effect of America on 
bias are examined.  In particular, cognitive-affective mechanisms (Studies 9-12) and 
cognitive-motivational mechanisms (Studies 13 and 14) are discussed.  In terms of 
cognitive-affective mechanisms, one clear place to start the search is stereotyping, a 
phenomenon tightly related to prejudice.  As noted in Study 2, stereotyping shares 
some predictive overlap with prejudice—that is, stereotyping is a distinct construct, 
though prejudice and stereotyping share some of the same antecedents and outcomes 
(e.g., Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Rudman & Ashmore, 2007; Amodio & Devine, 2006).  
The complex relationship between prejudice and stereotyping will not be fully 
discussed here, however, it is noted that the constructs themselves share a bidirectional 
relationship, such that prejudice can lead to stereotyping, and stereotyping can lead to 
prejudice (e.g. Rudman & Glick, 2001; Scott & Brown, 2006).  This latter possibility 
is tested in Study 9 as a potential explanation of the implicit America prime effects 
reported here.  That is, I test whether priming America activates a stereotypical 
representations of outgroups, which then leads to prejudice. 
  A second cognitive-affective explanation is that prejudice itself is directly 
activated as a result of implicitly priming America and diverse groups simultaneously 
or in close succession.  Context-dependent priming, or pattern activation, suggest that 
a momentary representation of a concept is partly determined by stable associations, 
but is also influenced by the context in which that representation is activated.  Here, it 
is argued that implicitly priming America and non-White groups could selectively 
activate prejudice.  America is also associated with egalitarianism, which might be 
specifically activated when implicitly priming America and Caucasians.  These ideas 
are tested in studies in which accessibility after an implicit America prime is measured 
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directly (Studies 10A and 10B) and indirectly (Studies 11 and 12).  The latter studies 
also investigate the differential activation resulting from implicit versus explicit 
processing of an America reminder. 
 A cognitive-motivational mechanism is also tested.  Social identity theory 
contends that the mere self-categorization of people into social groups can lead to 
prejudice when an identity is made salient (e.g., Brown & Tajfel, 1979; Tajfel, 1982).  
Several factors can increase the salience of a given identity, such as perceived 
differentiation between groups and real or perceived conflict between one’s ingroup 
and outgroup.  Tajfel (1982) hypothesized that the reason why identity salience results 
in prejudice is because one’s ingroup is intimately tied to one’s identity, meaning that 
when one’s ingroup is challenged, one’s self-esteem becomes threatened.  One way of 
reducing this threat is through prejudice.  The predictions that derive from this model 
of motivated prejudice (as they are related to the effect of interest) are tested in Studies 
13 and 14.  Specifically, if America reminds one of a threat, especially one relevant to 
their ingroup-outgoup context, an America cue could lead to prejudice (Study 13), and 
if one’s identity is made salient because that identity is associated with America, then 
that identity could cause prejudice (Study 14).  The chapter ends with a brief 
discussion of how cognitive-affective and cognitive-motivational mechanisms might 
collectively result in the implicit America cue effect demonstrated in this and other 
chapters.   
Study 9  
 The effects of an implicit America cue on evaluative stereotyping were shown 
in Study 2.  In the present study, less evaluative and more cognitive form of prejudice 
is examined.  Amodio and Devine (2006) found that stereotyping and prejudice can be 
distinguished by their semantic versus affective antecedents.  Some research has 
blurred the line between prejudice and stereotyping by tapping into affective, rather 
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than cognitive associations.  For example, the evaluative stereotyping measure used in 
Study 2 confounded valence (that is, affect) and stereotypes, such that all the possible 
stereotypes associated with African-Americans were negative and all stereotypes 
associated with White Americans were positive.  Amodio and Devine (2006) proposed 
that the overlap between stereotype-related and prejudice-related outcomes is largely 
due to this sort of confounding.   
 While these researchers’ claim is well-supported, it should not be over-
interpreted:  even studies investigating stereotypes in other ways have found a close 
relationship between the constructs, and stereotypes that are not overtly negative (e.g., 
athletic) likely acquire affective positivity or negativity in some situations simply by 
virtue of being associated with a liked or disliked group (e.g., Dovidio, Brigham, 
Johnson, & Gaertner, 2006).  The point here is that it is unclear whether stereotyping 
is ever fully void of affect, and even when affective stereotyping is measured, it 
appears to be its own construct, with distinct predictive value.  To the researchers’ 
point, however, evaluative stereotype based measures leave more ambiguity in terms 
of whether a stereotype is activated or whether affective negativity is induced.  Thus, 
using a tool that measures both evaluative and non-evaluative stereotypes may help to 
pinpoint whether a stereotypical representation of group members is activated when 
diverse groups are co-activated with America, or whether an affective judgment is 
made even without the spontaneous activation of a stereotypical representation of 
groups.  The following study uses a measure that assesses both non-evaluative and 
evaluative stereotypes to try to disentangle these possibilities. 
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 Method 
 Participants 
Thirty-four White American and Asian American students at Cornell 
University were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (implicit America prime 
versus control prime) in a between-participants design.  
 Stimuli and Procedure  
In the first part of the experiment, participants completed a computer task 
similar to that described in Studies 1A, 1B, and 2.  Briefly, participants were primed 
with either the letters USA (implicit America prime condition) or VMH (control prime) 
for 32ms, followed by a letter-string mask for 38ms, and then were presented with 
either a plant or tree, which they were to categorize using the t or p on their keyboard 
to indicate whether they believed that the image was a tree or plant, respectively.  
Participants completed 32 trials of this task.  
 LDT measure.  All participants then completed a lexical decision task (LDT) as 
part of an ostensibly unrelated experiment (see Appendix F for the list of word 
stimuli).  This tool is used to measure currently activated concepts.  Each trial of the 
LDT began with a cross-hatch (+), followed by either a Black or White face for 80ms, 
then a target word or nonword letter-string, presented for up to 3 seconds.  Participants 
were asked to categorize the targets as either words or nonwords as quickly as 
possible.  The LDT included positive words, negative words, neutral words, 
nonwords, athletic Black stereotypes, musical Black stereotypes, and negative Black 
stereotypes.  The participants completed 112 trials, in which Black and White faces 
were paired twice with musical stereotypes, twice with athletic stereotypes 
(collectively, Black non-evaluative stereotypes), four times with Black negative 
stereotypes, eight times with positive, negative, and neutral words, and twenty-four 
times with nonwords.  The presentation of targets was randomly determined by the 
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computer.  The rate at which one could correctly categorize a particular type of word 
after a given prime was a measure of how much the first concept (here, an ethnicity) 
made the second concept more accessible (here, stereotypes, positivity, and so on).  In 
the present study, I wanted to see if priming America, made stereotypical Black 
Americans more accessible, and thus, I measured the degree to which activating Black 
made Black stereotypes accessible, either after an America prime or a control prime. 
 Self-report measures.  After completing the LDT, participants were asked to 
respond to the following demographic and individual difference items: gender, age, 
ethnicity, GPA, political group affiliation, and political news following.  Participants 
also completed a nationalism scale (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) in which they were 
asked to indicate their degree of agreement with 20 items (e.g., “Although at times I 
may not agree with the government, my commitment to the U.S. always remains 
strong”).  Participants responded on 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree).  Lastly, participants were probed for suspicion.   
 Results  
 These results were assessed in two ways.  In the first set of analyses, a 
difference score was calculated for each type of word by subtracting the average 
reaction times (RT) for each type of word, from the average RTs for neutral words 
(e.g., neutral words minus positive words).  This creation of difference scores was 
done separately for words primed by Black and words primed by White, yielding two 
sets of difference scores (Black primed and White primed).  For each word type 
(positive, etc.), the White primed difference score was subtracted from the Black 
primed difference score.  This set of calculations resulted in scores for each of four 
types of words (positive, negative, non-evaluative Black stereotypes, evaluative Black 
stereotypes).  Each score indicated the degree to which “Black” primed the associated 
concept, with more positive scores corresponding to more facilitation of activation.  In 
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the second set of analyses, no difference scores were created, but Black primed words 
and White primed words were entered in a repeated measures analysis, controlling for 
neutral words.  No significant or marginal effects emerged for either set of analyses  
(all Fs<1.97, ns).  Thus, implicitly processing the American flag did not increase 
stereotyping on this measure.   
 Moreover, entering self-reported nationalism into interaction analyses did not 
affect the results, nor did any other effects emerge with the other individual difference 
and demographic variables measured (all Fs<.21). No participants correctly guessed 
the relationship between the tasks, or the predicted results, however, eight participants 
reported seeing the prime in the implicit prime condition.  Removing these participants 
from the analyses did not change the results. 
 Discussion 
 The lack of an effect for non-evaluative stereotyping suggests that the implicit 
America cue effect on prejudice may be bypassing stereotypical representations on the 
way to negative affective judgments.  The only effect trending toward significance 
was a condition difference on negative words [F(1, 32)=1.97, p=.17], in which 
negative words presented after Black faces were more accessible in the implicit 
America prime condition than the control condition, again suggesting an evaluative 
effect.  It is possible that there were issues with the methodology of the study, for 
example, many people noticed the America prime—though, notably, no one was able 
to predict the hypotheses of the study.  That an effect was not found for Black negative 
stereotypes seems inconsistent with earlier findings, particularly Study 2, in which 
evaluative stereotyping was measured and Study 3, in which some of the individual 
items on the Attitudes Toward Blacks scale for which there were significant effects, 
involved explicit endorsement of negative Black stereotypes.   
 In order to address the concern that there was an issue with the LDT measure, 
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another study was done using a paper-and-pencil measure, and only one negative 
Black stereotype, aggressiveness.  This study also failed to produce any significant 
results for stereotyping of Blacks (all ts<1.03, ns).  It is not entirely clear why these 
two studies failed to produce even evaluative stereotyping after an implicit America 
prime.  It is possible that the methods and specific tasks used failed to capture an 
effect that exists, however, there are no obvious reasons why that would be the case.  
Future research is needed to illuminate the seeming inconsistency in stereotyping 
findings.   
 Given the unsuccessful attempts at producing an effect on stereotyping, a new 
line of cognitive-affective research was begun, this time assessing whether 
associations specific to America were responsible for the implicit effect of America on 
attitudes toward different social groups, and if so, which ones. 
Study 10A and Study 10B 
 In the following study, associations with America were measured using an 
LDT.  According to the literature, I expected that when an America cue was implicitly 
processed, egalitarianism would be activated (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2005).  I also 
tested whether prejudice was automatically activated after implicit exposure to an 
America cue.  A strong prediction is not warranted given the limited literature, 
however, work by Devos and Banaji (2005) in which the researchers found an implicit 
link between America and whiteness, could indicate that an evaluative link exists 
between those two concepts.  Even if an evaluative link exists, however, the 
accessibility of prejudice might only be heightened when outgroups are present.  Study 
10B addresses that issue.  In Studies 10A and 10B, associations with America in the 
absence of an intergroup context are assessed. 
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 Method 
 Participants 
Twenty-nine (Study 10A) and twenty-one (Study 10B) White and Asian 
students at Cornell University were randomly assigned to one of two conditions 
(implicit America prime versus control prime) in a between-participants design.  
 Stimuli and Procedure  
Study 10A and Study 10B use identical procedures, but an LDT testing for the 
accessibility of egalitarianism was used in the former and an LDT testing for the 
accessibility of prejudice was used in the latter.  In the first part of the experiment, 
participants were asked to complete the priming computer task first described in Study 
1B.  
 LDT measure.  All participants completed a lexical decision task (LDT) as part 
of an ostensibly unrelated experiment.  The LDTs in these studies used a procedure 
similar to the one described in Study 8, in which each trial began with a cross-hatch 
(+), followed by either the word USA or the letter-string VMH, and ending with the 
presentation of a target word or nonword letter-string.  Participants were asked to 
categorize the targets as either words or nonwords as quickly as possible.  LDTs in 
both studies included positive words, negative words, neutral words, and nonwords.  
In addition, the LDT in Study 10A included egalitarian-related words (egalitarian, 
equality, tolerance, fair), and the LDT in Study 10B included prejudice-related words 
(prejudice, discrimination, racism, bias).  The participants completed 64 trials, in 
which USA and VMH were paired sixteen times with a nonword, and four times with 
each type of word (egalitarian/prejudice, positive, negative, neutral).  The presentation 
of targets was randomly determined by the computer. 
 Self-report measures.  After completing the LDT, participants were asked to 
respond to the following demographic and individual difference items: gender, age, 
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ethnicity, GPA, political group affiliation, and political news following.  Lastly, 
participants were probed for suspicion.   
 Results  
 Before analyzing the results of the LDT, a difference score was calculated for 
each type of word by subtracting the average RTs for each type of word, from the 
average RTs for neutral words (e.g., neutral words minus positive words).  This 
creation of difference scores was done separately for words primed in the LDT by 
USA versus VMH, yielding two sets of difference scores (USA primed and VMH 
primed) for each of three types of words (positive, negative, egalitarian/prejudice).  
Each score indicated the degree to which USA or VMH primed the associated concept, 
with more positive scores corresponding to more facilitation by the respective prime.  
In a second set of analyses, no difference scores were created, but instead USA primed 
egalitarian (or prejudice), and VMH primed egalitarian (or prejudice), words were 
entered into a repeated measures analysis, controlling for positive, negative, and 
neutral words.  Both sets of analyses produced the same results, and thus, only the first 
set is presented here.  For Study 10A, in which the LDT contained egalitarian-related 
words, there was a main effect of condition on egalitarian words, controlling for 
positive and negative word difference scores, F(1, 25)=4.14, p=.05 (Figure 6).  For 
Study 10B, in which the LDT contained prejudice-related words, there was a main 
effect of condition on prejudice words, controlling for positive and negative words, 
F(1, 18)=7.32, p=.01 (Figure 6).  No effects were found for words primed with VMH, 
and the individual difference and demographic variables did not interact with the 
results in either study (all Fs<.41).  
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Figure 6.  The accessibility of egalitarian-related words (Study 10A) and prejudice-
related words (Study 10B) after an implicit America prime versus control prime.  The 
dependent measure was a lexical decision task.  Reaction times to egalitarian and 
prejudice words are reported in milliseconds and control for average reaction times to 
neutral, positive, and negative words. 
 Discussion 
 Consistent with other work (e.g. Devos & Banaji, 2005; Sears, et al., 2000), 
this study offers support for the hypothesis that egalitarianism is associated with 
America (Study 10A).  When implicitly primed with USA, prejudice also became 
more accessible (Study 10B).  If America is associated with both prejudice and 
egalitarianism, then the next question becomes, when will the prime lead to 
egalitarianism and when will it lead to prejudice?  This question is addressed in the 
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next two studies.  Taking into account both the literature and the present findings, it is 
plausible that when America is implicitly processed, it will lead to prejudice toward 
outgroups, while when explicitly processed, it will lead to egalitarianism toward all 
groups.  There are several studies presented here that have demonstrated the former 
effect; the latter effect is examined in the next study.   
Study 11 
 Having established that America is cognitively associated with both 
egalitarianism and prejudice, the following study seeks to clarify when egalitarianism 
versus prejudice might be activated.  The work presented here so far suggests that 
prejudice is activated when America is implicitly primed in the context of diverse 
groups or group members.  The limited available literature, however, suggests that 
when America is processed explicitly, egalitarianism is activated, even in the presence 
of diverse groups (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2005; Sears, et al., 2000).  Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen (2006) offer a plausible explanation for this discrepancy.  They suggest 
that implicit processing relies on associative processes.  Thus, if America is primed 
subtly or nonconsciously, and implicitly processed, the other concepts that become 
activated due to this implicit exposure will determine one’s behavior and attitudes.  
Study 12 will examine context-dependent activations when America is implicitly 
primed.  On the other hand, when one engages in explicit processing, Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen (2006) suggest that propositional, or rule-based processing occurring.  
Thus, if America is explicitly processes—that is, if one is able to consciously, 
deliberately process an America cue—the initial affective evaluation that likely results 
from an America cue in the context of diverse groups, is subjected to validity testing.  
In validity, or truth, testing, current attitudes are framed as propositions (e.g., “I dislike 
African-Americans’), and then tested for validity against other propositions that are 
thought to be relevant and hold subjective validity.  One source of relevant 
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propositions is norms, or shared beliefs, values, and expectations.  Thus, in the present 
case, when America is activated in the context of diverse groups, an initial negative 
evaluation of outgroups might be tested against known shared beliefs about America 
(e.g., “Americans are egalitarian”) and beliefs about oneself relevant to America (e.g., 
“I am American”, “I believe all people should be treated equally”).  This validity 
testing could plausibly result in the rejection of one’s initial negative evaluation of 
outgroups. 
 In the present study, rather than directly assessing activated concepts, I 
measured attitudes after implicit and explicit exposure to America.  Research suggests 
that currently activated representations guide attitudes and behavior.  While it is the 
case that some activated concepts are not revealed in measured attitudes or behavior 
(due to controlled processes and judgments of applicability), a strong case can be 
made (and has) that whatever behaviors and attitudes are revealed on measures, are a 
result of what is momentarily activated in memory (e.g., Bargh, 1994, 1997, 2007).  In 
other words, our behaviors are accurate, if not precise, indications of what is currently 
accessible.  Now that the associations with America (of interest) have been narrowed 
to prejudice and egalitarianism, one indirect method of assessing concepts associated 
with America in different contexts is by measuring one’s attitudes in those contexts.  
That is exactly what is done in the following study.   
 Method 
 Participants 
 One hundred fifty-one White American, Asian American, and Latino 
American students at Cornell University were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions (implicit America prime, explicit America prime, or control no prime) in a 
between-participants design.   
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 Stimuli and Procedure  
 All participants completed surveys containing both the manipulation and 
dependent measures.  Participants in each condition first completed the “Geography 
and Daylight” page described in Study 3.  In the implicit America prime condition, the 
“Geography and Daylight” task was identical to the one used in the implicit America 
prime condition described in Study 2.  In both the control condition and explicit 
America prime condition, participants completed the control version of the 
“Geography and Daylight” page as described in Study 2.  The dependent measure 
followed directly after the “Geography and Daylight” task.  Participants completed a 
Feelings Thermometer in which they were asked to “Please rate the extent to which 
you feel warm toward [Blacks/Whites]” on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at All Warm) 
to 100 (Extremely Warm).  In the explicit America prime condition, the 
aforementioned statement was preceded by the words “As an American”.  This small 
change in wording was the only difference between the control and explicit America 
prime conditions.   
 Participants completed demographic and individual difference items, including 
gender, age, ethnicity, GPA, political party affiliation, political news following, 
contact with Blacks and contact with Whites.  Participants were probed for suspicion 
after all other tasks. 
 Results  
 An interaction emerged between race and prime condition.  Using a repeated 
measures analysis, the interaction between race and prime condition was significant, 
F(2, 147)=6.42, p<.01 (Figure 7).  Participants’ warm feelings toward African-
Americans varied significantly by priming condition, F(2, 148)=8.49, p=.001.  Those 
in the implicit priming condition reported significantly less warmth toward African-
Americans (M=69.00) than those in the control condition [M=78.37;t(87)=2.58, 
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p=.01].  Those in the explicit condition, however, reported marginally more warmth 
toward African-Americans (M=83.66) than those in the control condition, t(114)=1.73, 
p=.09, and significantly more warmth than those in the implicit America prime 
condition, t(95)=4.06, p=.001.  Participants’ feelings toward Whites did not vary 
significantly by priming condition, F(2, 147)=1.47, ns.   
Figure 7.  Feelings of warmth toward Whites and Blacks reported on a Feelings 
Thermometer. 
A composite score was created for White and Black contact items (rs>.58).  Black 
versus White contact was calculated as a difference score in which the contact with 
Whites composite score was subtracted from the contact with Blacks composite score, 
such that higher scores reflected greater contact with Blacks.  In this experiment, 
Black versus White contact differed by condition significantly [F(2, 148)=7.97, 
p=.01], with the least relative contact with Blacks, relative to Whites, reported in the 
implicit America prime condition (M=-2.53), followed by the control condition (M=-
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2.01), followed by the explicit America prime condition (M=-0.98).  Controlling for 
the contact difference score variable, however, did not change the results of the 
experiment, F(2, 144)=5.73, p=.01.  The results of this experiment were not moderated 
by any other measured variable (all Fs<1.07).  
 Two participants in the explicit reminder condition were excluded from 
analyses due to their suspicion that the experiment was about prejudice and patriotism.  
The results of the experiment do not change if they are included in the analyses.  No 
other participants correctly identified the true purpose of the experiment, connected 
any of the tasks to one another, nor reported awareness of the America-related prime 
in the implicit America prime condition.   
 Discussion 
 These results demonstrate that when White and Asian Americans are implicitly 
primed with an American cue, their attitudes toward African-Americans, but not 
Whites become significantly less positive.  When participants were explicitly primed 
with America, their attitudes did not reflect prejudice, and instead they showed 
marginally more positivity relative to a control condition.  These findings were 
conceptually replicated using a large, standard size, hanging America flag as the 
explicit prime of America.  These studies are both taken as evidence that when 
implicitly primed with America in the context of diverse groups, prejudice is 
activated, but when explicitly primed with America in the context of diverse groups, 
egalitarianism is activated.  The next study offers a replication of the current study 
using a different dependent measure that better approximates egalitarianism versus 
prejudice (as opposed to affect) and adds a condition in which America is implicitly 
primed in the context of only White Americans. 
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Study 12 
 The following study uses a behavioral measure developed by Tajfel (e.g., 
1982) in order to further examine the associations primed by America in different 
contexts.  As demonstrated, America is implicitly linked with prejudice (e.g., Study 
10B), however, based on the reasoning that America is associated with prejudice due 
to a history of discrimination against non-White groups, it seems unlikely that this 
alternative set of associations will be activated upon exposure to America and Whites.  
Thus, it is predicted that, because America is a symbol representing equality, and 
because historically this equality may be particularly associated with Whites, there 
will be evidence for activation of egalitarianism when individuals are given an 
opportunity to engage in relevant behaviors. 
 In addition to conceptually replicating Study 11, this study includes a condition 
in which America is implicitly primed in the context of White Americans only and 
importantly, participants perform a task in which they are given the opportunity to 
engage in differing degrees of egalitarianism.  In past experiments, it is possible that a 
positive bias toward Whites was not found (except in Study 6) because participants 
may not necessarily feel more positively toward Whites, but would, if given the 
opportunity, be more egalitarian toward that group (that is, egalitarianism, specifically 
is activated).  
 Participants 
Ninety-seven White American and Asian American students at Cornell 
University were randomly assigned to condition in a 3 (implicit America prime, 
explicit America prime, or control prime) x 2 (White teammate versus Black 
teammate) between-participants design.  
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 Stimuli and Procedure  
In the first part of the study, participants completed a computer task that 
contained both the manipulation and the dependent variable measure.  The 
manipulation was included in the instructions for the experiment.  Namely, 
participants in the implicit prime condition were asked to help calibrate the screen for 
the computer task that would take place later.  Participants were asked to respond to a 
number of seemingly innocuous items (e.g., re-type a word that was presented in many 
different fonts), followed by personal questions (e.g., which of the following 
represents a goal of yours), the last of which asked about the person’s nationality 
(“What is your nationality?”).  Participants were asked to type in their response to the 
nationality item.  Next, they were taken to a screen that informed them that the screen 
had been successfully calibrated, and that the next task would begin shortly.  During 
this time (fifteen seconds), the question about nationality faded to gray, but remained 
on the screen.  In the explicit America prime condition, the participants followed this 
same procedure, except after they were asked to type in their nationality, they were 
asked to consider their national identity and keep it in mind when responding in the 
next task.  After fifteen seconds, the dependent measure task began.  Finally, in the 
control condition, participants completed all steps except they did not answer a 
question about the nationality.  After they responded to the last calibration item, they 
were informed that the screen had been calibrated; after thirty seconds, the dependent 
measure task began.  
Rewards Allocation Matrices.  The dependent measure was adapted from the 
rewards allocation matrices paradigm (e.g., Tajfel, 1982).  In this paradigm, 
participants are 1) given the task of dividing a set of real rewards (i.e., the 
experimenter pays out whatever money is awarded) between two other participants: a 
team member and a member of another team, and 2) told that other participants in the 
  65 
experiment would award money to them in the same way.  In the present experiment, 
participants were also told that they had been randomly divided into two teams of 
three people:  Team Square and Team Triangle.  The participant’s team was always 
Team Triangle and their teammate was always named Joel.  The member of the other 
team was either Alexander (White condition) or Lamar (Black condition). In order to 
designate rewards, participants were shown six different matrices (Appendix G) with 
thirteen different options for allocating rewards in each matrix.  The reward options 
were listed in two rows (divided into thirteen columns), with the top row always 
listing the teammate’s (Joel’s) allotment, and the bottom row always listing the other 
team member’s potential allotment (Alexander or Lamar).  The only stipulation for 
assigning rewards was that allotments had to be chosen from the same column, such 
that if one desired to give a certain amount to the teammate, the member of the other 
team received whatever value was directly below the one chose for the teammate.  The 
matrices flashed on the computer screen in random order, and participants were asked 
to indicate the matrix and their corresponding responses on an answer sheet.  
Participants were also asked to indicate their team name at the top of the answer sheet.   
 After completing the matrices task, participants were asked to respond to 
individual difference items, including their gender, age, ethnicity, grade point average 
(GPA), political news following and political group affiliation.  Lastly, participants 
were probed for suspicion. 
 Results  
 Pull scores were calculated for each participant on each of the matrices.  Pull 
scores reflect the relative strength, that is pull, of six possible strategies individuals 
could use to assign rewards:  maximization of ingroup profits (MIP), maximization of 
differences between groups (MD), maximization of ingroup profits plus the 
maximization of differences between groups (ingroup favoritism, or FAV), the 
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maximization of joint profits (MJP), the maximization of ingroup profits plus the 
maximization of joint profits (MIP + MJP), and parity (P).  Each matrix pitted two of 
these strategies against one another.  Matrix type A pitted FAV against MJP, and the 
pull of FAV on MJP was calculated.  In the obverse of matrix type A, MJP was pitted 
against FAV, and the pull of MJP on FAV was measured.  For matrix type B, the pull 
of MD on MIP + MJP was calculated; the pull of MIP + MJP on MD was calculated 
for the obverse of matrix type B.  For matrix type C, the pull of P on FAV was 
calculated; the pull of FAV on P was calculated using the obverse of matrix type C.  
No significant results were found for matrix type B or its obverse.   
 An interaction emerged such that the pull of FAV on MJP (matrix type A), was 
influenced by both race condition and prime condition, F(2, 89)=3.25, p<.05 (Figure 
8).  Consistent with predictions, allocations of rewards to a Black person were affected 
by prime condition [F(2, 45)=12.01, p<.001], such that the most ingroup favoritism 
was shown in the implicit prime condition (M=10.00), followed by the control 
condition (M=8.38), followed by the explicit prime condition (M=2.00).  Contrary to 
previous findings, the implicit prime condition did not differ from the control 
condition [t(31)=.11, ns], however, the explicit prime condition differed significantly 
from both the control condition [t(29)=3.83, p=.001] and the implicit prime condition 
[t(30)=4.98, p<.001].  Also contrary to expectations, behavior toward a White target 
did not vary by condition.  
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Figure 8.  The relative pull of the FAV strategy on the MJP strategy (matrix type A) in 
the rewards allocation matrices task.  Higher scores reflect greater pull of FAV on 
MJP. 
 The obverse of matrix type A, the pull of MJP on FAV, also produced 
significant results.  An interaction between race and prime condition emerged, F(2, 
88)=4.25, p<.05 (Figure 9).  The modulation of allocations of rewards to a Black 
person by condition trended toward significance, F(2, 44)=1.89, p=.16.  Allocation of 
rewards to a White person varied significantly [F(2, 44)=5.03, p=.01], such that the 
MJP strategy (relative to the FAV strategy) was employed least in the control 
condition (M=-1.69), followed by the implicit prime condition (M=.94), followed by 
the explicit prime condition (M=1.80).  This effect was driven by the difference in 
allocations to White targets in the explicit prime condition versus the control 
condition, t(30)=2.98, p<.01.  
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Figure 9.  The relative pull of the MJP strategy on the FAV strategy (the obverse of 
matrix type A) in the rewards allocation matrices task.  Higher scores reflect greater 
pull of MJP on FAV. 
 The interaction between race and condition was significant for the pull of P on 
FAV, matrix type C, F(2, 90)=3.30, p<.05 (Figure 10).  Allocations of rewards 
differed by condition when participants were assigning rewards to Blacks, but not 
Whites  [F(2, 45)=5.05, p=.01], such that the most parity was shown toward Blacks in 
the explicit condition (M=-2.13), followed by the control condition (M=-6.25), 
followed by the implicit prime condition (M=-8.71).  While this is the pattern of 
behavior predicted, only the implicit and explicit prime conditions significantly 
differed, t(30)=3.26, p<.01.  
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Figure 10.  The relative pull of the P strategy on the FAV strategy (matrix type C) in 
the rewards allocation matrices task.  Higher scores reflect greater pull of P on FAV. 
 An interaction between race and condition was also found for the pull of FAV 
on P, the obverse of matrix type C, F(2, 90)=4.69, p=.01 (Figure 11).  Allocations of 
rewards again differed by condition when participants were assigning rewards to 
Blacks, but not Whites  [F(2, 45)=4.36, p<.05], such that the most parity (least ingroup 
favoritism) was shown toward Blacks in the explicit condition (M=-7.07), followed by 
the control condition (M=-5.13), followed by the implicit prime condition (M=-1.88).  
The implicit prime versus control prime difference was found, [t(31)=2.03, p=.05], as 
was a difference between the implicit and explicit prime conditions [t(30)=3.05, 
p<.01], though the control prime and explicit prime conditions did not significantly 
differ.  
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Figure 11.  The relative pull of the FAV strategy on the P strategy (obverse of matrix 
type C) in the rewards allocation matrices task.  Higher scores reflect greater pull of 
FAV on P. 
  No individual difference factor moderated these findings (all Fs<.65).  No 
participant in any condition guessed the hypotheses of the experiment.  One 
participant was excluded due to a belief that the experimenter was a team member in 
the experiment, though including this participant in the analyses did not change the 
results. 
 Discussion 
 This study offered mixed support for the predictions.  For the matrices in 
which two methods for showing ingroup favoritism were pitted against one another 
(i.e., maximizing ingroup profit and maximizing differences between groups), no 
significant effects emerged.  If participants varied in which strategy they choose, 
rather than on average choosing one strategy over the other, then these null effects are 
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explainable.  That is, prejudice may have been present, but because pull scores 
measure the preference of one strategy over another, an inconsistency in average 
strategy use would result in the null effect found for matrix type B and its obverse.  
 On the remaining matrices, the expected patterns emerged for allocations of 
rewards to a Black target, however, there was a failure to replicate the implicit prime 
versus control condition difference for all but one of the calculated pull scores.  
Nevertheless, in most cases, behavioral prejudice (or ingroup favoritism) was 
illustrated in individuals’ strategy choices most in the implicit prime condition, 
followed by the control condition, then the explicit prime condition.  Given the pattern 
that was found, it is plausible that if the sample size were larger, these trends would 
yield significant effects.   
 The effects predicted for Whites by and large did not emerge.  One viable 
explanation is that the competing motivation to support one’s team member, rather 
than to be egalitarian toward Whites, more generally, outweighed the egalitarianism 
effect; this might also contribute to the failure of differences to reach significance 
between the control prime and explicit America prime condition in the allocation of 
rewards to Blacks.  Indeed, minimal groups paradigms—in which people are split into 
groups based on a frivolous or arbitrary distinction—have produced strong ingroup 
favoritism effects on these matrices (e.g., Tajfel, 1971).  Though participants were 
explicitly told that they were randomly assigned to a team, that creation of groups is 
often enough to produce ingroup-outgroup effects.  Of course, this explanation cannot 
account for why allocations for Blacks varied by condition more often, and more 
extremely than those toward Whites.  It may be that an egalitarian strategy is deemed 
particularly applicable when there are clear differences between individuals or groups 
(i.e., when assigning awards to Blacks and Whites), versus when there do not seem to 
be any obvious differences between recipients of the awards (i.e., when assigning 
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rewards to two White individuals).  This point is further discussed in the final chapter 
in a section dealing specifically with the effects (or lack thereof) of an America cue on 
attitudes and behaviors toward Whites. 
 Taken with Studies 10A, 10B, and 11, there is evidence that prejudice is 
activated when America is implicitly primed either alone, or in the context of African-
Americans. As has been demonstrated, this activation can have many negative 
consequences for Blacks and other non-White groups.  When America is explicitly 
primed, whether alone or in the context of African-Americans, egalitarianism is 
activated.  Regardless of how America is primed, there has been little evidence that 
the activation of America has an impact on attitudes or behaviors toward Whites.  
These null effects could be due to problems with restriction of range on measurement 
tools, or features of the task.        
 In the next two experiments, the possible explanation for why many of the 
predictions in the present study were not supported—that is, self-categorization 
processes—is examined as a potential explanation for the implicit America reminder 
effects reported in many of the studies so far (that is, increased prejudice against non-
White groups). 
Study 13 
 Social identity and self-categorization theories provide a potential explanation 
for why implicitly processing an America cue leads to prejudice.  America’s history of 
strife, and current issues, between Blacks and Whites could become accessible to 
those implicitly primed with America.  If that were the case, a reminder of America in 
the context of Blacks may actually activate a conflict ridden, threatening situation.  
Thinking about a threatening context for one’s ingroup, could make one’s identity 
salient, which could activate an ingroup protection motive (e.g., Brown & Turner, 
1979).  An ingroup protection motive is ultimately in the service of protecting one’s 
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self-esteem.  As many theories of prejudice predict, threats to self-esteem can cause 
one to lash out against an available outgroup, likely due to a need to restore one’s self-
worth and self-integrity (e.g., Brown & Turner, 1979; Fein & Spencer, 1997).  
Denigrating outgroup members, it is theorized, also undermines outgroup members’ 
views, beliefs, and values, which is one viable and attractive method for affirming 
one’s own views, beliefs and values (e.g., Brown & Turner, 1979; Fein & Spencer, 
1997).  
 In the present study, I examined the extent to which an America prime acted as 
other threats to self-esteem have been shown to act.  That is, if America is activating a 
threat to self-esteem, it should act as another known threat to self-esteem:  poor 
performance in a self-relevant and subjectively important domain.  In addition, theory 
regarding self-affirmation has suggested that while a threat to one’s ingroup promotes 
prejudice, an affirmation prior to experiencing a threat, should protect one’s self-
esteem, and thus, the potential for prejudicial behaviors should be reduced.  I also 
tested this possibility. 
 I chose to use performance on an “IQ test” in the preset study given the 
prevalence of this manipulation in the literature, as well as the likelihood that college 
students would feel that performance in the domain of intelligence was both self-
relevant and important.  Participants experienced either success or failure on the test, 
then were primed with America or not.  The reasoning here is that if America is 
activating a threat, which then results in prejudice, the effects of prejudice should be 
reduced if one is affirmed first, and perhaps unaffected or exaggerated when one 
receives the additional threat of poor performance on an IQ test. 
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 Participants 
Seventy-five White American and Asian American students at Cornell 
University were randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (implicit America prime versus 
control prime) by 3 (success, no test, or failure) between-participants design.  
 Stimuli and Procedure  
 Participants in the success and failure conditions first completed a Remote 
Associates Test that was used to either affirm or threaten their self-esteem.  
Participants in the no test condition did not complete this task.  After the test in the 
success and failure conditions, and as the first task in the control condition, the 
research assistant came to set up the dependent measure computer task, deliberately 
closing the Remote Associates Test in the success and failure conditions so that the 
desktop wallpaper would be shown for 2-3 seconds.  In the implicit prime condition, 
the desktop wallpaper was an American flag, stretched to fit the screen of the 
computer.  In the control condition, the wallpaper was solid blue.  The research 
assistant then opened a program containing the Black-White attitudes IAT described in 
Study 1A.  Participants in all conditions completed the IAT, then completed 
demographic and individual difference items, including gender, age, ethnicity, GPA, 
political news following, and political group affiliation.  Finally, participants were 
probed for suspicion. 
Remote Associates Test.  The Remote Associates Test (RAT; Mednick & 
Mednick, 1962) was used to manipulate self-esteem in the domain of intellectual 
performance.  In the RAT, each item contained three words, and participants were 
asked to identify a fourth word that was associated with each of the other three words.  
For example, one of the twelve items given on one of the tests was falling, actor, dust, 
and the correct response was star.  Participants in the success (or self-esteem 
affirmation) and failure (or self-esteem threat) condition completed a version of the 
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RAT.  All participants who took the test were told that it was a valid measure of IQ.  A 
hard and easy version of the test was pretested, and on average, participants got 25% 
of the items on the hard test correct, and 75% of the items on the easy test correct.  In 
addition, after the participants completed the test, participants in the easy condition 
were told that their test score fell in the 95th percentile of Cornell students who had 
taken that test, while participants in the hard condition were told that their test scores 
fell in the 33rd percentile.   
 Results  
 A significant prime condition by test condition interaction emerged [Figure 12; 
F(2, 71)=3.32, p<.05], however many of the predictions were not unsupported.  A 
main effect of test condition on prejudice measured by the IAT, within the control (no 
flag) condition, suggested that the known modulator of self-esteem, did indeed 
influence prejudice in the expected manner, F (2, 33)=5.32, p<.05.  That is, the least 
bias was found when participants were affirmed in the success condition (M=.07), 
followed by the no test condition (M=.29), followed by the failure condition (M=.56).  
Within the implicit America prime condition, there appeared to be no effect of the test 
manipulation, F(2, 38)=.35, ns.  Instead, the implicit prime resulted in high amounts of 
prejudice across test conditions.  Given that the success condition reduced bias when 
America was not primed, this resulted in a significant effect of prime condition within 
the success condition [t(22)=3.30, p<.01], wherein there was greater bias in the 
implicit prime condition (M=.68) than the control no prime condition.  There was also 
a marginal effect of prime condition within the no test condition, replicating the 
established implicit effect of an America cue on bias effect that has been presented 
[t(26)=1.71, p=.10], wherein prejudice was higher in the flag condition (M=.56) 
relative to the control no prime condition.  No other significant effects emerged, 
including within the analyses that included individual difference and demographic 
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variables.  
 No participants in the implicit America prime condition reported awareness of 
the desktop wallpaper.  No participants in any condition guessed the hypotheses of the 
experiment, nor did anyone correctly guess the relationship between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable. 
Figure 12.  Prejudice as a function of test condition and prime condition.  Bias was 
measured using the IAT, where higher D’ scores (bias) reflect a greater ease of 
pairing White-positive and Black-negative than the reverse pairing. 
 Discussion 
 The results of this study do not support the hypothesis that America acts as a 
social identity threat.  Alternatively, an established method of manipulating self-
esteem (poor versus strong performance on an IQ test) did have the predicted effects 
on self-esteem.  That is, doing poorly on the IQ test increased prejudice on the IAT, 
while doing well buffered one’s self-esteem, and thus, reduced prejudice.  These 
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findings are consistent with the literature and suggest that there was not a problem 
with the tool used to measure prejudice—that is, if prejudice was present, then it likely 
would have been captured on the IAT.  Likewise, there was a marginal effect of the 
desktop wallpaper prime on prejudice in the no test condition, and in fact, the prime 
increased prejudice in across all test conditions (though not significantly in the failure 
test condition).  These findings suggest that the desktop wallpaper prime, though a 
novel method of priming America, did appear to increase prejudice like other America 
primes.   
 It is not entirely clear what to make of these findings.  It is possible that 
America is, in fact, a reminder of a threatening situation in which Blacks are the 
relevant outgroup, but that the effect is too powerful to be buffered by the affirmation 
used in the experiment.  Perhaps an experiment that used an alternative method of 
affirming individuals would find support for the hypotheses, however, there are no 
theoretical reasons to predict situational differences in the effectiveness of different 
methods of affirmation.  The next study re-examines the possibility that social identity 
processes are at the root of the implicit America cue findings.   
Study 14 
 Despite the results of Study 13, recent studies hint at the possibility that self-
categorization and social identity processes might play a role in the effect of an 
America cue on bias.  For example, in one study, when nationality was framed as 
sharing a set of common attributes and heritage, but not when it was framed as sharing 
a common goal, patriotism and nationalism were negatively correlated with tolerance 
for cultural diversity (Li & Brewer, 2004).  Likewise, asking White Americans to 
imagine a threat common to all American citizens (across ethnicities) resulted in more 
positive attitudes toward Blacks (Dovidio, ten Vergert, Stewart, Gaertner, Johnson, 
Esses, Riek, & Pearson, 2004).  Dovidio et al. (2004) suggested that one explanation 
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for this finding was that the threat to America highlighted the shared set of 
circumstances and goals common to all Americans, thus diminishing the boundaries 
between ethnic groups.  It is true that this intervention may have reduced bias simply 
through the explicit, versus, implicit processing of an America cue.  Nevertheless, 
these studies, and particularly the former, imply that a national identity can be both 
divisive and inclusive.  Li and Brewer (2004) explicitly induced different construals of 
American identity with their manipulation, but what if simply implicitly priming 
America in the context of diverse groups resulted in the activation of an exclusionary 
national identity (one based on an obvious set of shared attributes and heritage)?  
 Devos and Banaji (2005) indeed found that implicitly, America was more 
closely associated with being White than any other ethnicity for White and Asian 
Americans.  In other words, priming America, an ostensibly shared identity among 
ethnic groups, might instead make White American salient, an identity not shared with 
other ethnicities.  If this were true, then according to self-categorization theory, several 
ingroup-outgroup processes might ensue, such as accentuation of similarity within 
groups and differentiation between groups, increased affective positivity toward the 
ingroup, increased perception of conflict between groups, and as has been found in the 
current work, increased negativity toward the outgroup.  The next study examines the 
extent to which the America=White effect reported in Devos and Banaji (2005) 
moderates the implicit effect of America on bias.  If the America=White effect acts as 
a moderator, it will be taken as initial evidence that the implicit effects of America on 
bias are intricately linked to the extent to which one implicitly associates America and 
being White, perhaps suggesting a role for social identity in explaining these implicit 
effects.   
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 Participants 
Forty-eight White American and Asian American students at Cornell 
University were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (implicit America prime 
versus control prime) in a between-participants design.  
 Stimuli and Procedure  
 Participants first completed a survey that contained the manipulation and one 
of the dependent measures.  They were told that the survey was part of an unrelated 
pilot study.  The surveys contained the Geography and Daylight task described in 
Study 3.  The implicit America prime condition had American flags in the pictures of 
the task as well as on subsequent pages of the survey.  No flags appeared on the 
control version of the survey.  The dependent measure of attitudes appeared on the 
second page of the survey, and consisted of the Feelings Thermometer described first 
in Study 7.  Following the Feelings Thermometer, participants responded to a number 
of filler questions.  
 All participants then completed the America=White IAT (Devos & Banaji, 
2005) described below.  After completion of the IAT, participants completed measures 
of demographic and individual difference items, including gender, age, ethnicity, 
GPA, political news following, and political group affiliation.  Finally, participants 
were probed for suspicion. 
America=White IAT.  The America=White IAT in this study used the same 
stimuli, and followed the same procedure, as the one described in Devos and Banaji 
(2005).  The categories were White Am. and African Am. and the attributes were 
American and foreign.  Half the time, White Am.-American and African Am.-foreign 
were paired first, and half the time African Am.-American and White Am.-foreign 
were paired first.  There was no effect of the order of the IAT [F(1,43)=.22, ns].  
Participants were asked to categorize Black faces, White faces, foreign objects (e.g., a 
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foreign bill) and American objects (e.g., the dollar bill) as quickly as they could. In the 
following analyses, higher scores on the America=White IAT represent a greater 
association between American and White (and Black and foreign) than the reverse set 
of pairings. 
 Results  
 The predicted interaction between race and condition emerged [F(1, 43)=5.85, 
p<.05], though attitudes toward neither group differed significantly by condition.  
Notably, however, attitudes toward Whites (M=77.92) and Blacks (M=72.17) 
significantly differed in the implicit flag prime condition [t(23)=3.44, p<.01], but not 
in the control condition [t(23)=.85, ns].  A significant three-way interaction among 
race, prime condition, and America=White scores also emerged, F(1, 43)=4.29, p<.05 
(Figure 13 and Figure 14).  This interaction was driven by the interaction between race 
and condition for those with a strong America and White association, F(1, 17)=5.79, 
p<.05.  No such interaction emerged for those with a weak America and White 
association, F(1, 26)=.11, ns.  For those with a strong America and White association, 
attitudes toward neither Whites nor Blacks differed significantly across condition.  In 
the implicit America prime condition, however, attitudes toward Whites (M=72.50) 
differed from attitudes toward Blacks [M=63.33; t(11)=3.53, p<.01], while there was 
no difference in attitudes between races in the control condition [t(6)=0, ns].    
 No participants in the implicit America prime condition reported awareness of 
the America prime.  Likewise, no participants in either condition guessed the 
hypotheses of the experiment, or the relationships among the tasks. 
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Figure 13 and Figure 14. The interaction between race and prime condition in the 
prediction of feelings of warmth toward Whites and Blacks for individuals with a weak 
(Figure 13) and strong (Figure 14) America-White association. 
 Discussion 
 These results offer initial evidence that it is only for those with a strong 
association between White and America that an America prime leads to negativity 
toward Blacks and other non-White groups.  So, how might this explain the effect of 
an implicit reminder of America on attitudes toward outgroups?  Given the strong 
association between White and America, one might expect that when individuals are 
primed with America in the context of diverse groups, their own ethnic identity is 
made salient (that is, activated).  A study testing this hypothesis directly should be 
done.  A large body of social identity and self-categorization literature would suggest 
that activating “White American” should then lead to a number of self-categorization 
processes, such as negativity toward a relevant outgroup, like Black Americans.  
Again, a study should be done to test this mediational explanation directly.   
 The explanation given here can easily be merged with the cognitive-affective 
mechanisms discussed earlier for a more complete mechanistic picture.  In short, the 
association between prejudice and America that is found even in the absence of 
diverse groups likely underlies the divisive, versus inclusive, sort of American identity 
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that is hypothesized to be activated in the context of diverse groups.  One could 
imagine that if America were only associated with the unity and egalitarianism that 
many Americans explicitly endorse, then activating America would likely activate a 
shared, inclusive identity in place of the exclusionary one that could be explaining the 
effects reported here.  Likewise, as suggested in the present study, the self-
categorization processes that are hypothesized to result from the salience of a White 
American identity, ought to make prejudice more accessible, and thus more likely to 
be evidenced in attitudes, beliefs and behavior.  
 This is a provocative explanation for the results, however, note that here, it is 
only for those with strong associations between White and America that there was an 
effect of an implicit reminder on America.  One critical question is:  to what extent do 
people, on average, associate White and America?  In the present study, the overall 
association between White and America for participants was M=.29, on par with that 
found by Devos and Banaji (2005) in their work (M=.34), and significantly different 
from zero, t(46)=7.03, p<.001.  Moreover, a strong negative (and linear) correlation 
between warmth toward Blacks and D’ in the implicit prime condition [r(24)=-.57, 
p<.01], but not the control condition [r(23)=-.20, ns], suggests that the effect may be 
linear—that is, the more one associates America and White, the more one will show a 
prejudice effect when implicitly primed with America—rather than binary (i.e., 
present or not).    
 Finally, if the salience of one’s identity and subsequent self-categorization 
processes explain the implicit effects of America on bias, then what should be made of 
the results of Study 13?  Those results are difficult to reconcile with the present 
explanation.  Whether implicit priming of America highlights White identity because 
it is a reminder of ingroup-outgroup conflict, or because of a cognitive association 
with whiteness, the predictions for the effect of a self-affirmation prior to exposure to 
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an America cue are the same:  prejudice should be reduced.  Future research is needed 
to explain this inconsistency.  If an alternate method of affirming the self, breaking 
down barriers between groups, or highlighting a shared identity work to reduce 
prejudice induced by an implicit America prime, an explanation will be needed to 
explicate the situational dependence of these affirmations. 
 There is another possibility.  While the results of Study 14 are consistent with a 
cognitive-motivational explanation, in general, and an explanation rooted in social 
identity theory, more specifically, the results do not preclude a cognitive-affective—
that is, association-based—explanation, in which one’s identity could be largely 
inconsequential.  These possibilities are discussed in detail in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Across sixteen studies, there is strong evidence that an implicit America prime 
leads to prejudice against non-White outgroups.  Overall, White and Asian American 
participants responded negatively toward Blacks and other non-White groups when 
reminded of America in a subtle, or nonconscious manner, but responded relatively 
positively toward these same groups when reminded of America in a blatant, or 
conscious manner.  The implicit effect is robust.  Evidence for the implicit effects of 
America was found using different types of America cues, and using both visible (e.g., 
Studies 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8) and subliminal (e.g., Studies 1A, 1B, and 2) implicit 
priming methods.  Conceivably, these methods of implicit priming approximate the 
way in which one is unknowingly, but often, reminded of one’s nation (e.g., Billig, 
1976).  Moreover, the prejudice effects occurred regardless of whether one was 
evaluating a social group (e.g., studies 1A and 1B) or an individual member of that 
social group (Studies 5 & 6). 
 The present research primarily investigated the influence of an implicit 
reminder of America on attitudes (Studies 1A, 1B, 3, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14), however, given 
the correlation of attitudes with behavior and beliefs, for example, the present research 
also tested whether an implicit reminder of America would have an equal impact on 
other outcomes.  And indeed, priming participants with an implicit America cue had 
consequences for evaluative stereotyping (Study 2), stereotypical beliefs (Study 3), 
behavioral intentions (Studies 4, 5, and 6), and behavior (Study 12).  While further 
work is needed to determine the exact mechanisms underlying the effect, there is 
evidence that both prejudice and egalitarianism are implicitly associated with America 
(Studies 10A and 10B), and that the accessibility of those concepts when America is 
primed depends upon the context in which the priming occurs and whether one is 
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explicitly or implicitly processing the America prime.  In particular, when one is 
exposed to America implicitly, and in the context of non-White groups, prejudice is 
selectively more accessible (Studies 11 and 12); when an America cue is explicitly 
processed, there is some evidence that egalitarianism is activated, and particularly so 
in the context of non-White groups (Studies 11 and 12).  Furthermore, in the case of 
implicit priming, the patterns of activation that were empirically supported here could 
be due to the salience of one’s exclusive, rather than inclusive, American identity 
when reminded of America (Study 14).  
 There were some potential limitations and unanswered questions in the current 
research.  Many were discussed in earlier chapters.  In this section, two are 
highlighted:  1) Why are attitudes toward Whites seemingly unaffected by both an 
implicit and explicit reminder of America, and 2) To what extent is the effect of an 
implicit reminder of America driven by priming cognitive associations with America 
versus American identity, and are these distinguishable effects? 
 Attitudes toward Whites.  Though there was a reliable effect of an America cue 
on attitudes toward non-White groups, an America cue had a negligible impact on 
attitudes toward Whites, with only a couple exceptions.  There are at least two reasons 
to expect that exposure to an America cue would produce more positive attitudes 
toward Whites.  First, an implicit reminder of America is proposed to make one’s 
identity salient, which then leads to self-categorization processes.  Theoretically, 
favoritism toward the ingroup could result from the same self-categorization processes 
that produce prejudice.   
 In the present research, there actually is some reason to believe that ingroup 
favoritism was affected by an implicit prime.  A point to consider is that the largest 
effects were on the IAT, a measure that combines across ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup derogation. Certainly, the effect sizes could be due to the sensitivity of the 
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instrument, but it could also be that the IAT captured both ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup derogation pooled together, producing an especially large effect. Although, 
given this reasoning, one might also expect larger effects on the rewards allocation 
task than were reported.  That is, the rewards allocation matrices task distinguished 
between ingroup favoritism and other, more impartial methods of divvying rewards, 
but not between ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation, given that the strategies 
covaried in the matrices.  That is, a person who was not feeling particularly warmly 
toward the ingroup, but was feeling quite negatively toward the outgroup, would likely 
have chosen the same set of allocations as someone who was feeling more warmly 
toward their ingroup than they were feeling negatively toward the outgroup.  Thus, if 
ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation produce an additive effect, it ought to 
have been evidenced on the rewards allocation matrices.  As discussed earlier, while 
some effects emerged on the matrices, they were not large effects, and in fact, were 
often trends rather than statistically significant effects.   
 There is some question about the extent to which the covariation of ingroup 
favoritism and outgroup derogation is inherent to self-categorization processes versus 
an issue with measurement, however, to the extent that ingroup favoritism is 
distinguishable from outgroup derogation, both conceptually and in measurement, it is 
likely that ingroup favoritism precedes outgroup derogation (e.g., Otten & Wentura, 
1999; Perdue et al., 1990).  Moreover, there is work to suggest that ingroup favoritism 
is the primary and preferred strategy in self-categorization outcomes, because it is 
milder, more covert, and more socially acceptable (see Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 
2002).  Thus, outgroup derogation is only likely to emerge when prejudice against the 
outgroup can be delivered in a subtle or disguisable manner, and/or when emotions 
toward outgroups reach an extreme, such as anger or contempt, versus disgust or 
aversion (e.g.  Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Hewstone et 
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al., 2002).  Then, perhaps what is needed is a  reconceptualized understanding of the 
findings.   Note, that in the control conditions of many of the studies, identity was 
made salient by nature of the dependent measurements.  That is, one  is asked to report 
their attitudes toward their ingroup and  outgroups (e.g., Studies 4, 7, 8, 11).   Thus, 
the small, but consistent (though, admittedly, typically statistically insignificant) 
difference between attitudes toward ingroups and outgroups reported in the control 
condition might reflect self-categorization processes of the milder sort, namely, 
ingroup favoritism.   
 Alternatively, priming with an America cue could heighten the salience of 
one’s identity, thus increasing the degree of negativity toward the outgroup  
(especially because America might be linked in memory to not just intergroup 
differences, but also intergroup conflict).  In such cases, outgroup negativity is more 
likely to reach an emotional extreme, and prejudice against the outgroup may be 
shown when it is an available strategy, even if it is socially uncouth.  Testing this new 
conceptualization of the findings could prove difficult.  A different control group 
could be used in which  attitudes toward Whites and Blacks are measured without first 
making one’s ingroup salient.  One could use an implicit measure that assesses 
attitudes toward Whites and Blacks separately and primes ingroup subliminally, 
although it is unlikely that measurement has reached a level of precision that would 
allow an observed difference between long-standing, stable warmth toward one’s 
group and the type of ingroup favoritism that arises from the mere mention of one’s 
ingroup.  Moreover, identity can be made salient implicitly, blurring the lines between 
stable ingroup warmth and increases in ingroup warmth due to identity salience, and 
making it perhaps impossible to measure such a distinction.  Minimal groups 
paradigms control for these issues, by allowing measurement of attitudes before 
groups emerge, directly after a group is formed, and later, in the face of competition 
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for resources or other sorts of conflict, however it is unclear how such issues could be 
resolved using the present paradigm and groups.  
 The second reason to expect that an implicit or explicit reminder of America 
might lead to more positive attitudes toward Whites is that America is associated with 
egalitarianism both implicitly and explicitly.  Perhaps the expectation here, however, 
should not be one of positivity, but of increased parity when one is implicitly or 
explicitly primed with America.  Only one study measured true egalitarianism (Study 
12), and in that study, participants were faced with a competing motivation to favor 
their contrived, and perhaps more salient, ingroup.  On the other hand, egalitarianism 
toward Blacks was increased in the explicit America prime condition, suggesting that 
even if there was a conflicting motivation, egalitarianism might still be evidenced—
and indeed, egalitarianism, by definition, involves applying an equal rule to groups, 
rather than favoring one group (even your own group) over another.  That Blacks were 
shown egalitarianism, but Whites were not seems surprising, and may be informative.  
Indeed, it could be that in this scenario, the tension between helping one’s ingroup 
versus helping one’s outgroup may have been more obvious when it involved a White 
and Black person than when it involved two seemingly similar White people.  That is, 
the contexts in which application of egalitarianism, particularly as it relates to 
America, seems most relevant are likely those that involve some real or perceived 
disparity between groups, and thus the script for acting egalitarian will only be enacted 
(and perhaps only activated) in those contexts.  Note, that while the ‘fair treatment for 
all’ statements that were written into many of the early American documents may have 
been intended specifically to refer to Whites, they were still prescribed for differences 
among groups (in beliefs, values, religion, heritage), otherwise such statements likely 
would have been deemed unnecessary.  To that end, highlighting some difference 
between the two recipients of awards in the rewards allocation study might have 
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encouraged the application of an egalitarian strategy.  A study in which differential 
nationalities, heritages, religions, or even universities are varied orthogonally to race 
could test this hypothesis.  Consistent with this reasoning is a recent study that 
examined when priming Chinese Americans with Chinese cues would result in 
increased senses of interdependence and community (Wong & Hong, 2005).  The 
researchers found that, relative to a control condition, after being primed with Chinese 
cues, Chinese Americans showed more cooperation during the prisoner’s dilemma 
game when playing with friends (the expected effect), but not with strangers.  In other 
words, in contexts in which a sense of community seemed particularly relevant, 
cooperation strategies were activated and applied, however in contexts in which 
interdependence was not subjectively relevant or its applicability was not obvious, 
there was no evidence of cooperative behavior, and such behavior was likely not even 
activated. 
 American and White or America and White.  The suggested mechanisms of the 
effect of an implicit reminder of America on attitudes toward Blacks and non-White 
groups include the automatic activation of cognitive associations with America in the 
context of non-White groups, followed by self-categorization processes spawned by 
the salience of one’s identity.  The data strongly support the first explanation, and 
certainly suggest that the second mechanism could be working in concert with the first 
in order to produce the outcomes.  Note, that the findings here—increased prejudice 
toward non-White outgroups when implicitly primed with America—do not require a 
self-categorization explanation.  Bargh (1997; 2007) for example, suggests that the 
activation of concepts can lead directly to behavior.  In one study, for example, 
priming participants with elderly-related words led them to walk more slowly down a 
hallway (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996).  The activation-behavior relationship is 
likely dependent on motivation, but need not be mediated by endorsement.  For 
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example, work on the shooter bias, has found that one’s knowledge of the 
stereotypical association between African-Americans and violence, but not their 
attitudes toward Blacks, is correlated with their bias for shooting unarmed African-
Americans during an interactive video game set up by the experimenters (for a full 
description of the shooter bias, see Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002).  
Moreover, Blacks demonstrated a shooter bias at levels similar to those of other 
groups.  All of these experiments point to the potential for the implicit effects of an 
America cue to depend on one’s known associations with America, rather than one’s 
social identity or even stable attitudes, but of course, as mentioned earlier, an 
association-based and an identity-based account are not mutually exclusive.  Thus, the 
question is, in addition to the accessibility of prejudice and White, is social identity an 
integral part of how implicit America cues affect attitudes and behavior toward 
outgroups—in other words, are the implicit effects of an America cue on attitudes 
toward outgroups due only to the associations between White and America, or are they 
also dependent upon whether these associations are linked with the self (i.e., an 
association among White, America, and self)?   
 One obvious place to start addressing this question is to examine the extent to 
which individuals of different identities show the effects and to what degree.  In 
particular, it is useful to consider identities about which the two explanations would 
make different predictions.  For example, Blacks do not offer much informative value 
as both cognitive-affective and cognitive-motivational models would predict that 
Blacks would not demonstrate the effect.  Briefly, from a cognitive-affective 
standpoint, unlike in the shooter bias example, the present effect represents an 
attitudinal shift, and there is little evidence to suggest that knowledge of negative 
Black-related information influences African-American’s implicit and explicit 
attitudes toward their ingroup (Hewstone et al., 2002; though, see Livingston, 2002).  
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Thus, there would not be a prediction that attitudes toward Blacks would be depressed.  
Moreover, though Blacks might share the same associations between America and 
prejudice as Whites, the script that might be activated would likely differ, and thus, it 
is more likely that negativity toward Whites would increase.  Likewise, social identity 
theory would predict that if America highlighted identity for African-Americans, it 
would likely result in reduced warmth toward Whites, not Blacks.  At first blush, an 
examination of an implicit reminder on Asians seem more informative—that is, it 
seems like a cognitive-affective, but not a cognitive-motivational explanation might 
predict that Asians would show the same effects as Whites.  And, as noted many 
times, both White and Asian participants were included in the analyses presented in 
the present research—and Whites and Asians do not differ in the magnitude of the 
effect shown toward outgroups.  These findings seem to undermine a cognitive-
motivational, social identity explanation, however, at second glance they may not.  
There is some work to suggest that Asian-Americans tend to identify with the majority 
group, that is, Whites, on matters relating to intergroup processes and outcomes (e.g., 
Pyke & Dang, 2003).  To that end, Asian-Americans may tend to have a strong 
America and White association (Devos & Banaji, 2005), and importantly, the 
activation of America in the context of diverse groups might make salient White 
American identity, which in this domain could be tied to their own self-concept.  As in 
the case of White Americans, then, differentiation from the outgroup(s) and other self-
categorization processes (in which Asians are aligned with Whites), could lead to 
prejudice.  
 There are some better ways to discriminate between the two explanations of 
the effects reported.  For one, if the effects truly are due to one’s social identity, then 
the effects ought to depend on the importance of a White American identity to the self.  
This, too, has issues as even weakly identified individuals can show large effects of 
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self-categorization (consider minimal groups paradigms, for example; see Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979).  Moreover, it is not clear that identification with a White American 
identity is as important as the sense that that identity is exclusive.  To that end, one 
might measure the dependence of the implicit America reminder effects on one’s 
stable view of American identity, such as whether it is racially exclusive or inclusive, 
or whether one endorses a shared culture or shared goal perspective on national 
identity.  Perhaps the best way to determine the importance of social identity, 
however, is to not measure identity at all, but rather focus more closely on outcomes 
predicted by social identity.  In particular, Mummendey & Schreiber (1983) found that 
discrimination based on social identity is much less likely to occur if one is able to 
evaluate the ingroup and outgroup on different dimensions—the cognitive-affective 
mechanism would predict no such nuance. 
 In terms of mechanism, the bottom line is that future research is necessary.  
The mechanism of the effect is important for theoretical purposes, but also for 
undermining the effects of an implicit America cue, which as have been discussed, are 
both robust and extensive.  The final section briefly discusses how the consequences 
of an implicit reminder of America have impact for the real world. 
 Conclusions.  Across many of the experiments reported, a subtle reminder of 
America ultimately lead to prejudice against non-White outgroups, representing a 
dissociation between what people report when explicitly, consciously, thinking about 
America and their behaviors and attitudes when implicitly reminded of America.  The 
effects reported across these studies have relevance for many domains, but perhaps 
most pertinently, the political world.  Consider the ubiquity of flags at polling stations, 
for example—in one of the reported studies, the mere unintentional processing of an 
America cue significantly reduced support for President Barack Obama.  Political 
strategists might take note of the perhaps counterintuitive effect of subtle America 
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cues.  An implicit America cue could also have effects on policy support—and the 
effects might be heightened when there is a real or symbolic competition for 
resources, such as with perceived zero-sum outcomes.  To that end, the framing of 
affirmative action as an American resolution could serve to reduce Whites’ and 
Asians’ support for the policy, for example.  
 Theoretically, these results are consistent with the current literature on 
cognitive dissociations, and expand on it by examining the effects of a national cue.  
They also offer up a lesson recurrent in social psychological research:  subtle 
environmental factors can trigger considerable, and often surprising, effects. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Category and Attribute Stimuli used in the Black-White IAT 
White Good 
Brad Gift 
Chip Pleasure 
Walter Laughter 
Ralph Rainbow 
Black Bad 
Tyrone Slime 
Leroy Cancer 
Jamal Cockroach 
Malik Vomit 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
Category and Attribute Stimuli used in the Evaluative Stereotyping IAT 
White Positive White Stereotypes 
Brad Industrious 
Chip Lawful 
Walter Ambitious 
Ralph Trustworthy 
Black Negative Black Stereotypes 
Tyrone Lazy 
Leroy Dangerous 
Jamal Violent 
Malik Unemployed 
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APPENDIX C 
The implicit flag prime condition version of the “Geography and Daylight” task. 
Geography and Daylight 
 
 
During what time of day was this picture 
taken? 
a. Morning 
b. Afternoon 
c. Evening 
d.  
 
During what time of day was this picture 
taken? 
a. Morning  
b. Afternoon 
c. Evening 
 
During what time of day was this picture 
taken? 
a. Morning 
b. Afternoon 
c. Evening 
 
During what time of day was this picture 
taken? 
a. Morning 
b. Afternoon 
c. Evening 
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The control condition version of the “Geography and Daylight” task. 
Geography and Daylight 
 
 
During what time of day was this picture 
taken? 
e. Morning 
f. Afternoon 
g. Evening 
h.  
 
During what time of day was this picture 
taken? 
d. Morning  
e. Afternoon 
f. Evening 
 
During what time of day was this picture 
taken? 
d. Morning 
e. Afternoon 
f. Evening 
 
During what time of day was this picture 
taken? 
d. Morning 
e. Afternoon 
f. Evening 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Items from the Attitudes Toward Blacks Scale (Brigham, 1977) were presented in the 
following fixed order.  
 
1. If a Black person were put in charge of me, I would not mind taking 
advice and direction from him or her. 
 
2. If I had a chance to introduce Black visitors to my friends and neighbors, 
I would be pleased to do so.   
 
3. I would rather not have Blacks live in the same apartment building I live 
in. 
 
4. I would probably feel somewhat self-conscious dancing with a Black 
person in a public place. 
 
5. I would not mind it at all if a Black family, with about the same income 
and education as me, moved in next door. 
 
6. I think that Black people look more similar to each other than White 
people do. 
 
7. Interracial marriage should be discouraged to avoid the “who-am-I?” 
confusion that the children produced by interracial marriage feel. 
 
8. I get very upset when I hear a White person make a prejudicial remark 
about Blacks. 
 
9. I favor housing laws that allow more racial integration of neighborhoods.  
 
10. It would not bother me if my new roommate were Black. 
 
11. It is likely that Blacks will bring violence to neighborhoods when they 
move in. 
 
12. I enjoy a funny racial joke, even if some people might find it offensive. 
 
13. The federal government should take decisive steps to override the 
injustices Blacks suffer at the hands of local authorities. 
 
14. Black and White people are inherently equal. 
 
15. Black people are demanding too much too fast in their push for equal 
rights. 
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16. Whites should support Blacks in their struggle against discrimination 
and segregation. 
 
17. Generally, Blacks are not as smart as Whites. 
 
18. I worry that in the next few years I may be denied my application for a 
job or a promotion because of preferential treatment given to minority group 
members. 
 
19. Racial integration (of schools, businesses, residences, etc.) has benefited 
both Whites and Blacks. 
 
20. Some Blacks are so touchy about race that it is difficult to get along with 
them. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
The Scale of Perceived Interpersonal Closeness (Popovic, Milne, & Barrett, 2003).  
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
 
Stereotype Positive Negative Neutral 
Criminal Cheerful Selfish Bulb 
Violent Kind Awful Register 
Poor Lively Bossy Door 
Lazy Happy Terrible Window 
Athletic Trusting Foolish Curtain 
Basketball Generous Neurotic Salad 
Rhythmic Wonderful Deceitful Computer 
Dance Appealing Rotten Airplane 
   Vacuum 
   Truck 
   Couch 
   Table 
   Mechanism 
   Tooth 
   Glasses 
   Leaves 
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APPENDIX G 
 
The Rewards Allocation task matrices (e.g., Tajfel, 1982).  
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